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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been a strong international interest in using pyroprocessing to close the 
fast nuclear reactor fuel cycle and reprocess spent fuel efficiently. To commercialize 
pyroprocessing, safeguards technologies are required to be developed. In this research, 
the use of Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) has been 
investigated as a method to safeguard the process and more precisely quantify the 239Pu 
content of pyroprocessing materials. This method uses a detector array with different 
filters to isolate the low-energy resonance in 239Pu neutron fission cross section. The 
relative response of the different detectors allows for the quantification of the amount of 
239Pu in the pyroprocessing materials. 
The Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code was used to design a prototype 
SINRD instrument. This instrument is composed of a neutron source pod and a SINRD 
detector pod. Experimental measurements were also performed to validate the MCNP 
model of the instrument. Based on the results from simulations and experiments, it has 
been concluded that the MCNP model accurately represents the physics of the 
experiment. In addition, different SINRD signatures were compared to identify which of 
them are usable to determine the fissile isotope content. Comparison of different 
signatures allowed for reduction in the uncertainty of the 239Pu mass estimate. Using 
these signatures, the SINRD instrument was shown to be able to quantify the 239Pu 
content of unknown pyroprocessing materials suitable for safeguards usage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Motivations 
The electrochemical refining system, or pyroprocessing, was originally 
developed at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in the 1960s. Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL), active in the development of pyroprocessing, emerged from the 
combination of Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-West) with the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Under ANL’s Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) 
program, the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) was built in Idaho. 
Pyroprocessing was a component of the IFR program and was used to perform the fuel 
recycle functions for the IFR. The IFR program was terminated in 1994, but the fuel in 
the reactor core at the time was considered to be unsuitable for long-term geologic 
disposal without some form of stabilization [1]. This stabilization is necessary due to the 
sodium heat transfer medium in EBR-II fuel assemblies, which is highly reactive with 
water. Pyroprocessing was deemed the most attractive option to achieve this stabilization 
as it was able to provide compact on-site spent fuel separations and fuel fabrication, an 
efficient handling of sodium bonding, critically-safe conditions for processing highly 
enriched fuel, and a robust method for processing high burnup fuel avoiding organic 
solvents [2]. Currently, most research on pyroprocessing is focused on the capability to 
close the advanced fuel cycle and on commercialization [1, 3].  
Several other countries have shown interest in pyroprocessing. India has 
expressed its preference toward pyroprocessing to perform the processing of their fast 
reactor spent fuel [4]. South Korea has an important research and development program 
for pyroprocessing and is more precisely working in collaboration with the USA on the 
usability of pyroprocessing for spent oxide fuel from light water reactors [1, 5]. The 
Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) in Japan is 
developing pyrochemical reprocessing for inter alia removing residual actinide elements 
from aqueous reprocessing waste [6]. As another example of this worldwide interest for 
pyroprocessing, the Commisariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) in France is participating 
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in a research program with 34 partners from Europe, Japan, and Australia to investigate 
the advantages of the process [7, 8]. Each country working on pyroprocessing has 
specific applications envisioned depending on their national program: the treatment of 
thermal reactor spent fuel to recycle actinides in fast reactors, the closure of the fast 
reactor fuel cycle, and/or nuclear waste management. Besides their different 
perspectives, the pyroprocessing community has shown interest in an international 
collaboration to improve the development of the process [9].  
Research about pyroprocessing has led to the conclusion that this technique 
presents the advantage to recycle actinides from high burnup spent nuclear fuel cooled 
for shorter times and at lower cost than the existing Plutonium and URanium EXtraction 
Process (PUREX) which is an aqueous process. In addition, pyroprocessing uses 
relatively small equipment which makes it suitable for use in relatively compact 
facilities. Another advantage of this process is that less waste is produced and fewer 
criticality accidents are possible since pyroprocessing is a non-aqueous process. The 
process has some proliferation resistance advantages due to the highly radioactive 
materials and high temperatures used in the hot cells, and to the fact that pure plutonium 
(Pu) is never individually separated in the process [9, 10, 11, 12].  
To globally capitalize on these advantages, the commercialization of 
pyroprocessing requires several improvements: increase of the throughput, enhancement 
of its remote operability, optimization of the process, waste minimization [13, 14, 15] 
and the development of safeguards. This safeguards requirement has been stated by the 
National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards 
Initiative (NGSI) to fulfill the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
requirements [5]. The main objective of the IAEA is “the timely detection of diversion 
of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purpose 
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection” [16]. A 
“significant quantity” (SQ) is defined by the IAEA as the approximate amount of nuclear 
material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be 
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excluded. For Pu, one SQ corresponds to 8 kg by element [17]. The spent fuel material 
used in pyroprocessing is an IAEA concern since it contains Pu, a direct use nuclear 
material1 [17], which may be attractive for an adversary willing to build a nuclear 
weapon. The IAEA has estimated the time required to convert Pu to the metallic 
components of a nuclear explosive device (conversion time) in order of 1-3 months [17]. 
Therefore the IAEA establishes certain frequency of inspections (timeliness goal2) to be 
able to detect the diversion of 1 SQ of nuclear material. In the case of Pu in an irradiated 
form this goal is 3 months [17]. As examples from 6% Pu MOX spent fuel, only 1.08 
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) assemblies (9x9) and 0.36 Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) assemblies (17x17) are necessary to be diverted to get one SQ of Pu [18]. 
Consequently, the quantity of Pu handled by pyroprocessing facilities represents 
hundreds of SQ. Thus, it is important to effectively safeguard pyroprocessing facilities. 
However, safeguards for pyroprocessing is complicated by the lack of an input 
accountability tank (IAT) and the difficulty associated with direct measurement of Pu in 
solid spent fuel. This has led to interest in research to develop new methods for 
safeguards applicable to a pyroprocessing facility.  
In summary, pyroprocessing presents several advantages compared to the current 
reprocessing technologies, especially for closing fast reactors fuel cycle. Its 
attractiveness has driven international research to improve the process. As a large 
amount of Pu is present in the spent fuel treated by pyroprocessing, safeguards 
instruments have to be developed to meet the IAEA requirement for Pu quantification in 
                                                 
 
1 A direct use material is a “nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive 
devices without transmutation or further enrichment. It includes plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, 
high enriched uranium and 233U. Chemical compounds, mixtures of direct use materials [e.g. mixed oxide 
(MOX)], and plutonium in spent reactor fuel fall into this category.” [17] 
 
2 The IAEA timeliness detection goal is “the target detection times applicable to specific nuclear material 
categories. These goals are used for establishing the frequency of inspections and safeguards activities at a 
facility or a location outside facilities during a calendar year, in order to verify that no abrupt diversion has 
occurred.” [17] 
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order to commercialize the process. Currently, safeguards instruments for 
pyroprocessing are still under research and untested.  
 
 
1.2. Pyroprocessing Process 
Pyroprocessing is a non-aqueous process based on electrochemical separation. 
The separation of spent fuel elements is performed through molten chloride salt (LiCl-
KCl-PuCl3 or LiCl-KCl-UCl3) electrolytes which are resistant to high levels of radiation 
and have a high electrical conductivity potential. Contrary to what the name 
pyroprocessing implies, fire does not appear in this process.3 However, pyroprocessing 
uses very high temperatures (>450ᵒC) at each step of the process and operates in hot 
cells with an inert argon (Ar) atmosphere to prevent oxidation [2]. Pyroprocessing uses 
high burnup spent fuel cooled for short times: the neutron dose of the transuranic (TRU) 
product from pyroprocessing is 140 times higher than that of pure Pu from a 
conventional Light Water Reactor (LWR) spent fuel (40000 MWd/MTU, 1 year cooling) 
[11]. 
The electrorefiner is the key operational unit in pyroprocessing. The goal of this 
unit is to electrolytically separate the actinides, the cladding hulls, bond sodium, and 
fission products (FP) using temperatures around 450ᵒC. The metallic fuel rods are 
chopped into short lengths (6-7 mm) and introduced into the basket of the electrorefiner. 
When a voltage is applied between the basket (which acts as an anode) and a cathode, 
molten salts transport actinides from the basket to the cathode. A concentration of 
2 mol% of actinide chlorides is maintained in the electrorefiner salt to support 
electrotransport. Depending on the type of cathode used, the potential applied, and the 
salt concentration, high purity uranium (U) metal only or both U and TRU elements are 
deposited: a steel cathode is used to recover only U whereas a liquid cadmium cathode 
(LCC) stabilizes U mixed with TRU metal elements. Figure 1.1  shows the two types of 
                                                 
 
3 For this reason, pyroprocessing has more recently adopted the name electrochemical processing.  
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materials that can come from this process [19, 20]. In the current engineering-scale 
equipment, approximately 4 kg of Pu and minor actinides with 1 kg of U on the LLC and 
around 15 kg of U on the solid cathode can be collected. When FP concentration in the 
salt exceeds pre-specified limits (10 mol%), the salt is sent to the ceramic waste process 
or is cleaned up and recycled back to the process. At the end of the electrorefining step, 
metal waste are left in the anode basket, ceramic waste are formed by the salts, and the 
cathode material will go through a purification step [1, 2, 10, 21].  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 1.1. Pyroprocessing materials: (a) dentritic uranium deposit on eletrorefiner 
cathode, (b) Cd ingot containing actinides 
 
 
 
The cathode processor ensures the purification of the actinide deposit formed at 
the electrorefiner cathode. The salt left over in the deposits is removed by making it boil 
at around 800ᵒC, and the deposits are cast into a solid ingot using a temperature close to 
1,200ᵒC. The technique used in the cathode processor is vacuum distillation [1, 2, 10]. 
The waste process is divided into two steps both having the mission to 
concentrate FP into stable waste forms and make the waste suitable for permanent 
geologic disposal. On one hand, the metal waste furnace processes the cladding and the 
undissolved fuel left in the anode basket of the electrorefiner as well as noble metal FP 
(such as technetium, rhodium, and molybdenum). A temperature of 1,600ᵒC is used to 
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melt the stainless steel-rich alloy of the cladding. The metal is then consolidated into an 
ingot and is considered as a High-Level Waste (HLW). On the other hand, the ceramic 
waste processing has the role to immobilize the contaminated salt from the electrorefiner 
containing cesium, strontium, and rare earth elements. At temperature between 500ᵒC 
and 900ᵒC, FP combined with zeolite and glass are heated and then cooled into a 
stainless steel can [1, 2, 10]. 
Research on pyroprocessing has been adapted to applying the process to spent 
oxide fuel from commercial LWR in order to recover actinide elements and recycle them 
to the reactor as fuel materials. Subsequently, a voloxidation step and an oxide reduction 
step have been investigated to make oxide spent fuel compatible with the electrorefining 
and the other steps of the original pyroprocessing process. The goal of the voloxidation 
step is to fully oxidize (and powder) the spent fuel from LWR. Once the spent oxide fuel 
is completely oxidized, the oxide reduction transforms this spent fuel to a metallic form 
enabling it to be introduced in the electrorefiner and to undergo further pyroprocessing 
steps [1, 10, 13]. Figure 1.2 summarizes the pyroprocessing steps into a flow sheet.  
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Figure 1.2. Pyroprocessing flow sheet 
 
 
 
1.3. Current Study to Safeguard Pyroprocessing 
Developing safeguards for pyroprocessing is challenging since there are few 
pyroprocessing facilities and those that do exist are at national laboratories and not 
subject to international safeguards. Thus, the process has only been developed at 
laboratory or pilot-scale, meaning that the quantity of material currently injected in a 
pyroprocessing facility is smaller than the quantity that would be used commercially. 
The lack of experience with pyroprocessing and with the assay of nuclear materials in 
metal or salt solutions by destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA), 
make the development of a safeguards technology more difficult. The materials 
containing Pu in pyroprocessing facilities are very different from current reprocessing 
facilities [22]. The difficulty to safeguard pyroprocessing comes also from the hot cell 
environment. A hot cell is a shielded nuclear radiation containment chamber which 
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contains high-temperature, high-radiation fields and is difficult to access for 
maintenance. High temperature salt and metal solutions are highly corrosive. These 
constraints make the development of an instrument for measuring within the hot cell 
difficult [5, 23, 24].  
 
1.3.1. Gross neutron counts 
INL had first investigated the use of gross neutron counting to follow the 
materials containing Pu throughout the process and quantify Pu. This method has been 
inconclusive in measuring Pu as the spent nuclear fuel also contains curium (Cm) - a 
significant neutron emitter. Thus, the gross neutron counts are mostly attributed to 244Cm 
(and not Pu). 
A neutron balance (Cm accounting) method consists of measuring the gross 
neutron counts at several steps of pyroprocessing: at the input of the process, at the 
electrorefiner, at the casting, and at the output of the process. It would be possible to 
deduce the amount of Pu in the process by determining through NDA or DA the Pu to 
Cm ratio and the Cm amount. If the Pu to Cm ratio stays constant through the process, 
the amount of Pu can be deduced and a measurement of this ratio at the beginning of the 
process could reveal the contribution of Pu on the neutron emission relative to Cm. 
However, the difficulty to detect Cm in processed salt has slowed down the development 
of this method. Also, the inseparability of Pu and Cm would have to be proven and the 
measured material need to be homogeneous to use this method for safeguards [5, 25, 24]. 
 
1.3.2. Digital cloud chamber 
The pyroprocessing hot cell environment presents a challenge for NDA of the 
material due to high-temperature and high-radiation level. INL has been working on 
pyroprocessing safeguards via diversion pathway analysis, the development of a digital 
cloud chamber (DCC) along with the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, and Monte-Carlo 
N-Particle (MCNP) [26] modeling of the detector response around the electrorefiner.  
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The cloud chamber concept was originally developed by Wilson in 1912 [27]. 
The device is a sealed container generally filled with supersaturated water or alcohol 
vapor. When radiation enters the cloud chamber, it ionizes the surrounding atoms and 
gas molecules condense around these ions. Thus, radiation tracks in the cloud chamber 
form streaks of mist in the device. The type of radiation and its energy can be identified 
by analyzing the size, width and length of these streaks. The DCC got its name because 
of its coupling with two digital cameras. The cameras are placed orthogonally to 
visualize the radiation track in 3D. The cameras have a 10-megapixel resolution and are 
equipped with a high speed connection (fiber optics) transmitting data to electronics 
outside of the hot cell environment. Figure 1.3 [28] shows the design of the instrument 
(a) and the radiation tracks in a cloud chamber (b). The four pistons shown on the figure 
ensure a supersaturated vapor by providing a sufficient volume [28].  
The DCC has the advantage of not being altered by high temperature and high 
radiation exposure, to be low cost and to require a small amount of energy (110V/60Hz). 
INL is demonstrating that the DCC can identify a gamma-ray source in terms of isotope 
emitter, intensity and location of the source. This system will make it possible to 
determine if the Pu content of a material is homogeneously distributed and will use an 
inverse spectroscopy algorithm capable of determining the energy and the spatial origin 
of a gamma ray. Depending on the energy and spatial resolution of the results, the DCC 
could be able to quantify Pu in pyroprocessing. The primary goal of the DCC is to 
confirm that Pu is located where it should be and not anywhere else. Neutron streams in 
the DCC could also be used, but present more difficulties to analyze due to the low 
interaction between neutrons and the gas of the DCC. INL had originally developed this 
system for long term hot cell monitoring before considering its use in pyroprocessing. 
The disadvantages of the DCC for use in pyroprocessing are that it requires a long 
counting time, it is a physically large detector (100,000 cm3), and it is not specific to 
measuring Pu [5, 28, 29].  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1.3. Digital Cloud Chamber: (a) Design of the DCC and (b) tracks observed 
with the instrument 
 
 
 
1.3.3. Safeguards by design 
The Korea Advanced Pyroprocessing Facility (KAPF) has been used as a 
conceptual facility to develop a Safeguards By Design (SBD) approach for LWR 
pyroprocessing. The goal of this approach is to design a new facility taking into account, 
since the beginning of its design, the safeguards provision and features. This facility was 
divided into seven Material Balance Areas 4 (MBAs) containing twelve Key 
Measurement Points5 (KMPs) where the material flow was analyzed using both NDA 
and DA with random and systematic uncertainties based on the International Target 
                                                 
 
4 A material balance area is “an area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) the quantity of nuclear 
material in each transfer into or out of each ‘material balance area’ can be determined; and (b) the physical 
inventory of nuclear material in each ‘material balance area’ can be determined when necessary, in 
accordance with specifier procedures, in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes 
can be established.” [17] 
 
5 A key measurement point is “a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be 
measured to determine material flow or inventory. ‘Key measurement points’ thus include, but are not 
limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.” 
[17] 
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Value (ITV) 2000 [30]. From the uncertainty in Material Unaccounted For6 (MFU) 
evaluation based on a hypothetical operating scenario, it was concluded that a safeguards 
system for a pyroprocessing facility like KAPF could be designed to meet the IAEA 
requirements [31, 32]. However, this approach has not been confirmed for usage with 
pyroprocessing of fast reactor fuel. 
NDA techniques investigated by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(KAERI) for accounting for nuclear materials include a passive neutron-based assay 
accounting for electrolytic-reduction uranium and process materials, active neutron 
coincidence counting, and gamma-ray spectroscopy measurement. A Passive Neutron 
Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) counter was designed for direct measurement of fissile 
content in the process and will be tested in hot cells at INL. A surveillance system 
composed of neutron monitors, surveillance cameras and motion detection was 
developed to send monitoring information of the surveillance system to the IAEA and 
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) in the U.S. This system was developed not only for 
nuclear material accountancy and monitoring in pyroprocessing but also for the IAEA 
remote safeguards verification system [25].  
SNL has also created a model of a commercial-scale electrochemical plant using 
Matlab Simulink. The goal of this model is to design and analyze safeguards and 
security systems simulating material flow rates, material accountancy and process 
monitoring measurements [33].  
 
 
1.4. Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry Method 
The term Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) has been 
used by the IAEA for methods using Self-Indication Neutron Resonance Absorption 
                                                 
 
6 The material unaccounted for “is calculated for a material balance area over a material balance period 
using the material balance equation, commonly written as: MUF= (PB+X-Y)-PE where PB is the 
beginning physical inventory, X is the sum of increases to inventory, Y is the sum of decreases from 
inventory, PE is the ending physical inventory.” [17] 
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Densitometry (SINRAD) for measurement on spent fuel, using the Cm self-contained 
neutron source [34]. The SINRAD measurement technique was originally developed in 
1968 by Howard Menlove at Los Alamos National Laboratory [35]. In this method, the 
neutrons issued from spontaneous fission of 244Cm in spent fuel are used to react with 
the fissile content of spent fuel fulfilling the self-interrogation of the spent fuel. These 
neutrons will slow down in any moderating material surrounding the spent fuel object. 
This will produce an interrogation source with a 1/E spectrum of neutrons in the 
resonance region. This energy distribution about 0.3 eV is a crucial component of the 
SINRD method as it provides a high neutron flux for the resonance of interest.  
The design of SINRD used in previous research [18] uses fission chambers (FC) 
to detect neutrons. A FC is a neutron detector containing gas and a small layer of 
fissionable material on the chamber inner wall –usually highly enriched uranium (HEU).  
The neutrons inducing fission in this fissionable material can be detected indirectly by 
the fission fragments. The two fragments issued from a fission event travel in opposite 
directions, i.e. one fragment is absorbed by the wall of the detector and the other enters 
the gas. Then, the ionization caused by this second fragment in the gas is sensed by the 
detector. FCs have low neutron detection efficiency and are more sensitive to thermal 
neutrons. However, FCs have a low sensitivity to gamma rays [36]. Considering that 
pyroprocessing hot cells are high gamma-ray environments, the FC is the detector type 
more likely to provide usable neutron output data. In addition, if a large number of 
neutrons are available for counting, the low efficiency of FCs is not an issue. Thus, 
SINRD is a candidate to be considered to measure fissile content in pyroprocessing 
material. Neutron methods are usually preferred for safeguards and accounting because 
of their high material penetrability compared to gamma rays; gamma rays would only 
see the exterior part of the measured material.  
The SINRD method has been investigated for nuclear safeguards and material 
accountability measurements and led to the conclusions that: (1) the MCNP model of 
SINRD accurately simulates the physics of the experiment on fresh fuel assemblies, 
(2) SINRD requires calibration with a reference material to be insensitive to any 
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potential sources of bias error, (3) SINRD could accurately quantify 239Pu in BWR and 
PWR spent low enriched uranium (LEU) and MOX fuel when hafnium (Hf) is added to 
the Gd filter, and (4) SINRD provides improvements of current IAEA verification 
methods about burnup and fuel diversion [18].  
SINRD is based on isotope cross sections, which describe the likelihood that a 
neutron of different energies interacts with this isotope. The variations of likelihood of 
interaction between an isotope and a neutron form resonances in the cross section at 
specific incident neutron energies. The foundation of SINRD is based on the unique 
resonance structure in fission cross sections. The sensitivity of this method relies on the 
use of the same fissile material in the detector as the measured material. For example, 
239Pu FCs would be used to measure 239Pu in a sample. As the reaction occurring in the 
detection process is fission (n,f), the cross section of interest is the (n,f) cross section. 
The more 239Pu in the sample, the more neutrons with energy corresponding to a 
resonance will react with the fissile isotope in the sample and then fewer neutrons of the 
same energy will react with the fissile isotope in the FC [18].  
In this research, 239Pu and 235U are the isotopes of interest. These two fissile 
isotopes both present a resonance in their fission cross-section around 0.3 eV. Figure 1.4 
shows their fission cross-sections versus incident neutron energy and emphasizes their 
resonance at 0.3 eV. Cross section data comes from the Java-based nuclear information 
software (JANIS) evaluated nuclear data files (ENDF-VII.1) database [37]. The energy 
window of interest is represented by the black rectangle on the figure. To isolate this 
resonance for measurement, gadolinium (Gd)-covered and cadmium (Cd)-covered FCs 
are used. As Gd absorbs neutrons of energy below 0.13 eV, the Gd-covered FC detects 
neutrons of energy higher than 0.13 eV. Similarly, since Cd absorbs neutrons of energy 
below 1.25 eV, the Cd-covered FC detects neutrons of energy higher than 1.25 eV. The 
0.3 eV resonances from 239Pu and 235U are located in the window formed by Gd and Cd 
cutoff energies. In addition to these two FCs, a bare FC expected to measure the thermal 
neutrons and a boron carbide (B4C) FC complete the detector design. B4C absorbs 
neutrons of energy below 3.8 keV. The B4C FC is expected to measure the fast neutrons 
 14 
 
– neutrons above 3.8 keV. In the following, this FC will be called the fast flux 
monitor (FFM) [18].  
Figure 1.5 shows these different FCs in the SINRD instrument designed in 
previous research [18]. According to the FC used in SINRD, the neutron energy groups 
are defined as follow: thermal for neutron below 0.13 eV, epithermal for neutron 
between 0.13 eV and 3.8 keV, and fast for neutrons above 3.8 keV. As the 0.3 eV 239Pu 
resonance is larger than the 0.3 eV 235U resonance, the self-interrogation effect will be 
larger for 239Pu than for 235U.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                       239Pu                                               235U 
 
Figure 1.4. Fission cross-sections for 235U and 239Pu 
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Figure 1.5. SINRD instrument designed in previous research 
 
 
 
1.5. Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to design a safeguards instrument that 
can be used at pyroprocessing facilities, within the hot cells, to quantify the 239Pu content 
of pyroprocessing materials throughout the process. Online monitoring requiring small 
counting times is a desired characteristic for this instrument. The ability of SINRD to 
fulfill this quantification function will be investigated using an existing design of SINRD 
[18]. The pyroprocessing process investigated in this research is based on the INL Fuel 
Cycle Facility (FCF) pyroprocess to treat spent fuel from the EBR-II, i.e. metallic fast 
reactor spent fuel [12, 38]. 
In order to develop this instrument, MCNP version 5 (MCNP5) [26] and 
eXtended (MCNPX) transport codes [39] were used to: (1) design a neutron source with 
the desired neutron energy and spatial distribution, (2) model safeguards relevant 
materials to be measured (cans of U and ingots of Pu-bearing materials representing a 
pyroprocessing material), and (3) analyze the ability of SINRD measures to quantify the 
fissile content of the material.  
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Due to the restraint about measuring spent fuel, experimental measurements were 
instead performed on fresh fuel (specifically cans of U3O8 powder of varying 
enrichments) to validate the instrumentation design and its ability to quantify fissile 
content. In the case of U cans, the ability of the instrument to quantify 235U was tested. 
As 235U and 239Pu are both fissile isotopes with a resonance around 0.3 eV, the ability of 
the instrument to quantify 239Pu in spent fuel is expected to be related to its ability to 
quantify 235U in fresh fuel.  Experimental results obtained with FCs as well as 3He tubes 
in the detector pod were compared. As 3He tubes have a higher efficiency than FCs, the 
goal of this comparison was to evaluate if the two types of detectors with different 
efficiency have a similar behavior when the fissile content of the material varies. It is 
important to remember that 3He tubes could not be used in pyroprocessing hot cells 
because of their higher sensitivity to gamma rays compared to FCs. These measurements 
were also compared to MCNP simulations to verify the accuracy of the MCNP 
instrument model. The results of this research will evaluate the capability of the 
designed instrument to perform direct measurement of fissile content of pyroprocessing 
material and determine if the instrument is a suitable candidate to safeguard 
pyroprocessing facilities.  An overview of the MCNP simulations and experimental 
measurements performed is shown in Figure 1.6. 
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Figure 1.6. Overview of MCNPX simulations and experimental measurements for 
this research 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTRUMENTATION DEVELOPED  
 
In this research, the instrument was developed through simulations for 
application in the pyroprocessing process. This process uses spent nuclear fuel as its 
input and results in Pu and U bearing products potentially mixed with other minor 
actinides. However, due to constraints on handling spent fuel, the validation experiment 
for the instrumentation was performed using fresh fuel (specifically U3O8 in Al cans). 
Both fresh and spent fuels present a fissile isotope of interest – respectively 235U and 
239Pu. The configuration of the instrumentation used in the experimental part of this 
research is slightly different compared to the setup used in simulations on spent fuel. The 
two different configurations of instrumentation are described in this section.    
 
 
2.1. SINRD Detector Configuration 
The SINRD detector configuration used as reference [18] was optimized for 
LWR and BWR fuel assemblies. The detector unit was rectangular with a width equal to 
the width of the assembly [18].  The detector configuration for this research has been 
driven by the dimensions of the pyroprocessing materials of interest. However, the 
dimensions of the detector used for measurement on fresh fuel have been determined 
according to the equipment available to perform this experiment. In both cases, the same 
features as the previous MCNP SINRD design [18] were kept in the detector design: 
(1) the bare, Gd-covered and Cd-covered fission chambers are placed in aluminum for 
structural purpose7; (2) the FFM is placed in a Ultra High Molecular Weight 
Polyethylene (UHMWPE) block to thermalize the fast neutrons transmitted through the 
B4C to increase the FFM detection efficiency; and (3) the polyethylene is lined by Cd to 
reduce background from thermal neutrons reentering the detector pod.   
                                                 
 
7 Aluminum does not change a neutron energy much as aluminum does not interact strongly with a 
neutron. 
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Bare and FFM detectors respectively monitor the thermal and fast flux of the 
system whereas Gd and Cd detectors are specifically set up to react to fissile content. 
Thus, the bare and FFM detectors are always U FCs whereas the Gd and Cd FC are 
made of U or Pu depending on the fissile isotope to quantify. U FCs could be able to 
record a signature from a Pu sample as both 235U and 239Pu present a low-energy 
resonance around 0.3 eV. However, the signature using U FCs is expected to be lower 
than Pu FCs as the low-energy resonance is smaller for 235U than 239Pu. The 239Pu FCs 
modeled contain 1.5 mg/cm2 of fissile content – 94 wt% 239Pu metal whose density is 
equal to 19.8 g/cm3. All U FCs are 93 wt% 235U metal whose density is equal to 
19.1 g/cm3.  
As the electrorefiner is at the center of pyroprocessing, the materials coming 
from the electrorefiner were used to adjust the SINRD detector dimensions to the 
process. The two materials produced from the electrorefiner are the uranium deposit on a 
solid cathode and the actinide deposit on a LLC. Mostly 235U will be found as fissile 
content in the uranium deposit on the solid cathode whereas 239Pu is the fissile isotope of 
interest in the LCC. As 239Pu is the main concern for pyroprocessing safeguards, the Cd 
ingot formed in the LCC is the pyroprocessing material used in this research. However, 
the instrument developed could be tested to quantify the 235U content of the solid 
cathode as well.  As pyroprocessing is essentially developed on a lab scale, the materials 
issued from the process have relatively small dimensions. The uranium deposit is about 
9-cm high and has a 10-cm diameter including the cathode diameter. The Cd ingot 
bearing uranium, plutonium and other actinides is 1.67-cm high and has a 2.5-cm 
diameter [40]. As it would be convenient to have for future prospective only one 
instrument that can be used throughout the process, the biggest pyroprocessing material 
determined the dimensions of the SINRD detector for this research (even if only the Cd 
ingot is used). The detector length was then fixed at 9.4 cm and the width of the detector 
pod at 12.4 cm. Pu and U FCs were both used with the Gd and Cd filters to prospect the 
best SINRD signature.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the detector configuration with adapted 
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dimensions for use in pyroprocessing. Only the active length of the FCs has been 
modeled.  
The experiment performed on fresh fuel used 235U FCs to quantify the 235U 
content of U cans. The results are compared to those from measurements with 3He tubes. 
Fission counters model 30773 from LND, INC [41] were used for the Gd- and Cd-
covered fission chambers and fission counters model 30774 from the same manufacturer 
were used for the bare FC and FFM. Four same FCs were not available for this 
experiment: the 30773 FC is ten times more efficient than the 30774 FC. As the Gd and 
Cd-covered FCs were expected to record the fewest counts, the FCs with the highest 
efficiency available were used for Gd and Cd-covered detectors to obtain better counting 
statistics on these chambers. The 3He tubes used were the model 252 cylindrical 3He 
neutron detectors from LND, INC [41]. One should note that the connector and the 
electronics have not been modeled in the MCNP models, since these components do not 
significantly change the physics of the system. As connectors and electronics would add 
some noise to the system, we expect the MCNP uncertainties are slight underestimates 
compared to the experimental measurements.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2.1. MCNP model of SINRD detector for use in pyroprocessing: (a) top view 
and (b) A-A cut 
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The prototype of the experimental SINRD detector pod has been designed in 
order to keep the same amount and type of materials around the detectors as in previous 
research [18]: the Al block containing the bare, Cd-, and Gd-covered detectors is 
0.201 cm bigger than the detectors length at each detector end; the Cd- and Gd-covered 
detectors are respectively surrounded by 0.1 cm and 0.24 cm of Al; the UHMWPE block 
containing the FFM provides 1.08 cm of UHMWPE between the FFM and the B4C; this 
block has the same height and width as the Al block surrounded by B4C powder. All the 
detectors of the array are located at the same height in the detector pod. In order to 
contain the B4C powder, an Al case made of 0.5-cm thick plates was added to the 
prototype to surround the Al block and powder. The top Al plate has been machined in 
order to be removable to pack B4C powder in the detector pod. The natural B4C powder 
has been packed into the detector pod at a density of 1.06 g/cm3; this density could be 
increased up to 1.45 g/cm3. The FC and the 3He tubes chosen have a similar diameter but 
a different length. The detector pod dimensions were adapted according to the longest 
detector used for the experiment – the 3He tube. In addition, holes have been drilled in 
the detector pod to be able to insert and remove detectors from the pod. Because of these 
holes in the detector pod, B4C powder has not been included at the top of the detector 
pod. To ensure that both FCs and 3He tubes are located at the center of the detector pod 
while not changing the configuration of the pod, Styrofoam has been inserted before 
FCs. The Styrofoam compensates for the length difference between the FC and 3He tube 
but does not significantly affect the behavior of neutrons in the detector pod (due to its 
very low density). Figure 2.2 shows the experimental arrangement of the detector pod 
used for the experiment. The drawings used for machining of the equipment can be 
found in Appendix A. 
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(a) (b)          (c) 
Figure 2.2. Arrangement of the detector pod for the experiment: (a) dimensions of 
the detector pod machined for the experiment, (b) MCNP model of 3He tubes 
inserted in holes and (c) MCNP model of FCs with Styrofoam to maintain FCs at 
the center of the pod 
 
 
 
2.2. Neutron Source 
In pyroprocessing, there is not necessarily enough Cm decaying by spontaneous 
fission to self-interrogate the pyroprocessing material at each step of the process. An 
external neutron source is then needed to interrogate the item of interest. The neutron 
source must have a slowing-down energy spectrum, i.e. where the neutron flux is 
inversely proportional to the neutron energy. This moderated neutron spectrum is 
especially important to get usable counting statistics in the Cd-covered FC. 
Californium-252 (252Cf) was chosen to generate neutrons in this instrument. 252Cf 
is often used in experiments involving neutrons. This isotope emits neutrons by 
spontaneous fission. UHMWPE is a well-known moderator, i.e. neutrons scatter in 
polyethylene and then loose energy. In order to obtain a moderated neutron spectrum, 
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the 252Cf source was placed in UHMWPE. To generate a neutron source that was more 
spatially uniform across the front face of the detector pod, two 252Cf sources were placed 
inside a UHMWPE piece.  
The MCNP model of the source is shown in Figure 2.3. The two 252Cf sources 
were placed at the focal of an ellipsoid shaped block of UHMWPE. The characteristic of 
the focal of an ellipse is that, for whatever point chosen on the edge of the ellipse, the 
sum of the distance from each focal point to the edge is a constant. In other terms, each 
point on the edge of the ellipse is at the same distance from the two sources combined. 
This leads to a constant source of uncollided neutrons along the ellipse edge. A piece of 
nickel (Ni) was placed against the polyethylene. Ni is a weak reflector and moderator 
with a medium atomic mass. It is used in this design to smooth the neutron spectrum. 
Neutrons mostly scatter with Ni which has a scattering cross-section constant for neutron 
energy between 0.01 eV and 1 keV. Finally, a thin Gd sheet (0.1 mm thick) was placed 
on the front side of the neutron source. Consequently, only neutrons above 0.13 eV are 
emitted by the neutron source preventing fission at low energy in the material to 
measure. By only transmitting neutrons above 0.13 eV, most of the large 239Pu resonance 
is utilized. The lower energy neutrons are absorbed by the Gd sheet. They do not 
contribute to the self-indicating effect and if present, they will decrease the SINRD 
response [35]. For the MCNP simulations to quantify 239Pu, the source was 2-cm thick 
with reflective surfaces at the top and bottom to create an infinitely thick source, 
preventing neutrons from leaking in these two directions. 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. MCNP model of the neutron source as seen from above 
 
 
 
To better understand the effect of each material used in the source, MCNP tests 
have been run with the two 252Cf sources and with: (1) no other material, (2) UHMWPE 
only, (3) UHMWPE and Gd, and (4) UHMWPE, Ni and Gd. The neutron flux was 
calculated with MCNP at 0.1 cm from the Gd of the source using several energy bins. 
The energy bins were chosen according to the energies of interest for this problem. That 
is more energy bins were defined in the Gd-Cd window than at thermal energies as it is 
expected that Gd absorbs most of the thermal source neutrons. The energy bins are 
shown in Table 2.1. The neutron flux tallied by MCNP for each energy bin was divided 
by the bin size. The results are shown in Figure 2.4. The neutron spectrum from the 
sources alone shows a distribution with mostly fast neutrons. Adding UHMWPE around 
the sources thermalizes the neutrons and forms a slowing down distribution as well as 
Maxwellian distribution at thermal energies. Then, the thin Gd sheet absorbs most of the 
neutrons below 0.13 eV, decreases the neutrons flux at energies above but close to the 
cutoff (until 0.3 eV) and then leaves unchanged the slowing down distribution obtained 
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with UHMWPE only. The Gd energy cutoff is shown with a purple line on the figure. 
Finally, the neutron distribution including the Ni is shown. The Ni provides a slight 
smoothing to the neutron spatial and energy distribution. This last neutron spectrum has 
the desirable properties for this research and will be used in the instrument developed. 
This prototype design of the source has been obtained from different tests modifying the 
dimensions and shape of the materials to get a slowing down function with the highest 
neutron flux around the resonance of interest (0.3 eV). 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Energy bins used to calculate the source neutron spectrum 
Energy 
group 
Thermal 
Epithermal 
Fast in Gd-Cd 
window 
above Gd-Cd 
window 
Energy 
bins (MeV) 
[0; 1.0e-8] 
[1.0e-8; 1.0e-7] 
[1.0e-7; 2.0e-7] 
[2.0e-7; 4.0e-7] 
[4.0e-7; 0.5e-6] 
[0.5e-6; 0.8e-6] 
[0.8e-6; 1.0e-6] 
[1.0e-6; 1.0e-5] 
[1.0e-5; 1.0e-4] 
[1.0e-4; 1.0e-3] 
[1.0e-3; 1.0e-2] 
[1.0e-2; 1.0e-1] 
[1.0e-1; 1] 
[1; 1.0e+1] 
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Figure 2.4. Neutron spectrum from MCNP simulations using two 252Cf sources and: 
(1) no other material, (2) UHMWPE, (3) UHMWPE and Gd and (4) UHMWPE, Ni 
and Gd 
 
 
 
The infinitely thick neutron source previously described had to be modified for 
the purpose of the experiment with fresh fuel. On one hand, the experimental source 
cannot be too thick as it needs to be stored and moved in the experiment room. On the 
other hand, the source cannot be too thin as the neutron flux previously simulated would 
be considerably lower. MCNP simulations were performed to calculate the neutron flux 
for different source thicknesses. The results were then compared to the neutron flux 
obtained with the infinitely thick neutron source. Figure 2.5 shows the reduction of the 
flux from the infinitely thick source for different source thicknesses. According to the 
results recorded in this figure, a 12-cm thick source was chosen for the experiment. This 
thickness guarantees a relatively convenient handling of the source pod and only a 
quarter of the initial neutron source flux lost. 
 
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.00E+01
1.00E+02
1.00E+03
1.00E+04
1.00E+05
1.0E-10 1.0E-08 1.0E-06 1.0E-04 1.0E-02 1.0E+00
N
e
u
tr
o
n
 f
lu
x 
(n
/c
m
2 -
M
e
V
-s
o
u
rc
e
 p
ar
ti
cl
e
) 
Neutron energy (MeV) 
no material
UHMWPE
UHMWPE+Gd
UHMWPE+Ni+Gd
Gd energy cutoff 
 28 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Reduction of the source neutron flux for different source thicknesses 
 
 
 
Because of cost concerns for the validation experiment, the Gd sheet was 
removed from the neutron source to perform the experiment. The Gd sheet on the 
neutron source transmits neutrons only of energy higher than 0.13 eV and thus prevents 
fission events from occurring at low energy – below the Gd-Cd window. 239Pu and 235U 
have high cross sections for thermal neutrons. Thus, a thermal neutron has more chance 
to get absorbed than an epithermal (between 0.13 eV and 3.8 keV) or fast neutron (above 
3.8 keV), which means that a thermal neutron will on average travel a shorter distance in 
the material than other energy neutrons. Thermal neutrons will only be interacting with 
the exterior part of the material as they have more chance to interact with the material 
before they travel to its center. As a result of series of preliminary MCNP simulations 
with cans of different U enrichments, it was concluded that the change in counts in each 
FC was fairly consistent for the different 235U enrichment cans. With the Gd sheet 
removed from the source, the bare FC counts increase on average by 72%, the FFM 
counts decrease by 6%, the Gd-covered FC counts increase by 11% and the Cd-covered 
FC counts decrease by 3%.  As the thin Gd sheet on the source cuts most thermal 
neutrons, it was expected to have the biggest increase in the bare FC. Gd and Cd FCs are 
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also influenced by the thin Gd sheet as their cutoff energies are really close to thermal 
energy neutrons. It is also expected that the increase in Gd FC will be higher than in Cd 
FC as the cutoff energy of Gd is closer to thermal energies than Cd energy cutoff. As 
SINRD takes into account ratios of counts, the general trend of ratios with Gd on the 
source will be similar as the trend of ratios without Gd, but the magnitude will be 
different. Consequently, as the effects of removing the thin Gd from the source have a 
tolerable impact on the results, the prototype of the source was built without the Gd 
sheet for the experiment on U cans. 
 
 
2.3. Neutron Lifecycle 
An analysis of the 3-group neutron lifecycle can explain the expected behavior 
for the instrument. The neutron source described in section 2.2, with a thin Gd sheet on 
the surface, emits a source of neutrons with two energy groups: fast neutrons (Sfast) and 
epithermal neutrons (Sepi). The thermal neutrons from the source are absorbed in the Gd 
filter.8 Then, these source neutrons will either reach the material being interrogated and 
interact with it or leak to the FCs in the detector pod. If the source neutrons cause fission 
in the material, then new fast neutrons are created which can in turn interact with the 
material or leak to the detector. 
The behavior of a neutron in a system can be described analytically by 
probabilities depending on the material composition and geometry of the system. The 
following probabilities drive neutron behavior in the system:  
 PFNL = fast neutron non-leakage probability = probability that a fast neutron 
does not leak given that it was injected into the system 
                                                 
 
8 For simplicity, only one epithermal source term emitting neutrons of energies between the fast cutoff and 
the Cd cutoff has been considered in the lifecycle discussed below. To be rigorously correct, another 
epithermal source term emitting neutrons with energies between the Cd cutoff and Gd cutoff could be 
added. 
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 PENL = epithermal neutron non-leakage probability = probability that a 
neutron in the system does not leak from the system given that it slowed to 
epithermal energies (below 3.8 keV) without being absorbed or was injected 
into the system at epithermal energies 
 PENL_Cd = epithermal neutron non-leakage probability before Cd cutoff = 
probability that a neutron in the system does not leak from the system before 
slowing down to Cd cutoff energy given that it slowed to epithermal energies 
without being absorbed or was injected into the system at epithermal 
energies 
 PENL_Gd = epithermal neutron non-leakage probability before Gd cutoff = 
probability that a neutron in the system does not leak from the system before 
slowing down to Gd cutoff given that it slowed to Cd cutoff energy 
 PTNL = thermal neutron non-leakage probability = probability that a neutron 
in the system does not leak from the system given that it slowed to thermal 
energies without being absorbed 
 pepi = resonance escape probability to epithermal cutoff = probability that a 
neutron escapes the resonances (i.e., is not absorbed) and slows to epithermal 
cutoff energy (below 3.8 keV) given that it did not leak while fast 
 pepi_Cd = resonance escape probability from epithermal cutoff to Cd cutoff = 
probability that a neutron escapes the resonances (i.e., is not absorbed) and 
slows to the Cd cutoff energy (below 1.25 eV) given that it did not leak 
while epithermal above Cd cutoff 
 pth = resonance escape probability from Cd cutoff to thermal cutoff = 
probability that a neutron escapes the resonances (i.e., is not absorbed) and 
slows to thermal energies (below the Gd cutoff or 0.13 eV) given that it did 
not leak while epithermal nor get absorbed slowing down to Cd cutoff 
 uf = fast fissionable material utilization = probability that a neutron is 
absorbed in fissionable material given that it was absorbed while fast 
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 uepi = epithermal fissionable material utilization = probability that a neutron 
is absorbed in fissionable material given that it was absorbed while 
epithermal 
 uepi_Cd = epithermal fissionable material utilization before Cd cutoff = 
probability that a neutron is absorbed in fissionable material given that it was 
absorbed while slowing down to Cd cutoff energy 
 uepi_Gd = epithermal fissionable material utilization before Gd cutoff = 
probability that a neutron is absorbed in fissionable material given that it was 
absorbed while slowing down from Cd cutoff energy to Gd cutoff energy 
 f = thermal fissionable material utilization = probability that a neutron is 
absorbed in fissionable material given that it was absorbed while thermal 
 PFF = fast fission probability = probability that a neutron will cause a fission 
reaction given that it was absorbed in fuel while fast 
 PEF = epithermal fission probability = probability that a neutron will cause a 
fission reaction given that it was absorbed in fuel while epithermal 
 PEF_Cd = epithermal fission probability before Cd cutoff = probability that a 
neutron will cause a fission reaction given that is was absorbed in fuel while 
slowing down from the epithermal cutoff energy to Cd cutoff energy 
 PEF_Gd = epithermal fission probability before Gd cutoff = probability that a 
neutron will cause a fission reaction given that is was absorbed in fuel while 
slowing down from Cd cutoff energy to Gd cutoff energy 
 PTF = thermal fission probability = probability that a neutron will cause a 
fission reaction given that it was absorbed in fuel while thermal 
 f = neutrons per fast fission = expected number of fast neutrons produced 
per fast fission 
 epi = neutrons per epithermal fission = expected number of fast neutrons 
produced per epithermal fission 
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 epi_Cd = neutrons per epithermal fission occurring before Cd cutoff = 
expected number of fast neutrons produced per epithermal fission occurring 
from a neutron with energy between the epithermal cutoff and the Cd cutoff 
 epi_Gd = neutrons per epithermal fission occurring between Cd and Gd cutoff 
= expected number of fast neutrons produced per epithermal fission 
occurring from a neutron of energy between the Cd cutoff and Gd cutoff 
 th = neutrons per thermal fission = expected number of fast neutrons 
produced per thermal fission 
 FFM = absolute efficiency of the FFM detector = probability that a neutron is 
counted in the FFM given that it leaked from the system while fast 
 Cd = absolute efficiency of the Cd detector = probability that a neutron is 
counted in the Cd covered detector given that it leaked from the system 
while epithermal 
 Gd = absolute efficiency of the Gd detector = probability that a neutron is 
counted in the Gd covered given that it leaked from the system while 
epithermal 
 bare = absolute efficiency of the bare detector = probability that a neutron is 
counted in the bare detector given that it leaked from the system while 
thermal 
One should note that the neutron energy groups have been defined for this 
problem according to the different FCs used in the detector pod. Thus, the fast and 
epithermal groups have their lower bound respectively determined by the B4C energy 
cutoff (3.8 keV) and Gd energy cutoff (0.13 eV). A subgroup has been created in the 
epithermal group to take into account the Cd energy cutoff (1.25 eV). In general, these 
probabilities are all conditional probabilities conditioned on the neutrons previous 
history in the system. Due to this, we also see that the following identity is true given our 
definitions above: 
                      (2.1) 
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The neutron lifecycle, illustrated by Figure 2.6, is centered on the measured 
material located between the neutron source on one side and the detector on the other 
side. Thus, the inputs in this lifecycle are neutrons coming from the source and the 
output are neutrons leaking to the FCs. The neutron lifecycle begins with neutrons of 
different energies – fast and epithermal– coming from the source and entering the 
material.  
A fast source neutron is considered first to illustrate the neutron lifecycle. The 
probability that a fast source neutron does not leak to the detector is PFNL, the fast non-
leakage probability. If it did not leak while fast, pepi is the probability that the neutron 
does not get absorbed in resonances while slowing down from fast to the epithermal 
cutoff energy (3.8 keV). The probability that this neutron does not leak from the material 
while in the energy range between epithermal and the Cd cutoff is PENL_Cd. If it did not 
leak in this energy range, then the probability that it is not absorbed in a resonance while 
slowing down to the Cd cutoff is pepi_Cd. The probability that this neutron does not leak 
from the material while in the energy range between the Cd and Gd cutoff is PENL_Gd. If it 
did not leak while epithermal, pth is the probability that the neutron is not absorbed in a 
resonance while slowing down from the Cd cutoff to thermal (below 0.13-eV Gd cutoff). 
PTNL is the probability that the neutron does not leak while thermal. If it gets absorbed 
while thermal, f is the probability that this thermal neutron get absorbed by fissionable 
material given that it is absorbed. PTF is the probability that thermal absorption in 
fissionable material causes fission. If a thermal fission occurs, νth is the average number 
of neutrons emitted per thermal fission, and these new neutrons are born fast.  
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Figure 2.6. 3-group neutron lifecycle 
 
 
 
The number of fast neutrons in the system is equal to the number of initial fast 
neutrons emitted by the neutron source (Sfast) plus a number of neutrons (Qfast) 
depending on the fission events occurring and the average number of neutrons emitted 
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per fission. The number of neutrons produced by fission events in the system is given 
by: 
       (           )    (      )        [(      
     )             ]       (         )                     
[(           )             ]                         
                         
[(           )         
    ]                                     
(2.2) 
If the probability of a fast neutron that was born from fission in the sample not 
leaking from the sample was zero, then the number of fast neutrons produced by fission 
events in the system is given by: 
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(2.3) 
This simplifies to: 
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(2.4) 
Therefore the total number of fast neutrons inserted into the sample per cycle is 
given by: 
               (2.5) 
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Where M is the sample multiplication and is well approximated by  
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(2.6) 
Only the neutrons which leak from the material can contribute to the counts 
recorded by the detectors, but each neutron which leaks will not necessarily reach the 
FCs and cause a count. The absolute efficiency of the FCs (ε), which is dependent on the 
detector characteristics and the counting geometry, will determine the number of counts 
per neutron that leaks from the sample. 
The FFM measures the fast neutrons from the neutron source and from fission 
events which leak from the material. The count rate in this FC is a function of the source 
strength, the neutron multiplication and the fast leakage probability. The expected count 
rate in the FFM is given by: 
      (      )             (2.7) 
where CFFM is the count rate in the FFM in counts per second (cps). 
The bare FC records the thermal neutron leakage from the measured material. If 
we assume that the bare FC counts are dominated by the thermal neutron leakage, then 
the expected count rate in bare FC is given by: 
       (                    )                           
            
(2.8) 
This FC primarily measures the source strength as well as the neutron 
multiplication, the resonance escape probability from fast to thermal energies, and the 
thermal leakage probability of the material.  
The Gd- and Cd-covered FCs are used to form a window around the 0.3 eV 
resonance of 235U and 239Pu fission cross-sections. The count rates recorded by these FCs 
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are related to the resonance escape probability from fast to epithermal energies and to 
the epithermal leakage probability. The expected count rates in the Gd- and Cd-covered 
FCs (CGd and CCd, respectively) are given by: 
     [(      )             ][(         )
               (         )]     
(2.9) 
     [(      )               ](         )     (2.10) 
SINRD uses ratios of counts from different FCs to reduce the sensitivity of the 
measurements to extraneous material present in the fissile isotope-bearing material.  
Depending on the material measured, the ratios that are the most sensitive to the fissile 
material content will be used for fissile content quantification.  The uncertainties in the 
data will also determine the ratios to consider for this quantification. Using equations 
(2.7) to (2.10), several ratios are derived to illustrate the SINRD method. For instance, 
the bare to FFM FC ratio is acquired by dividing equation (2.8) by equation (2.7) and 
after some simplifications is given by: 
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]  (2.11) 
The bare/FFM ratio is proportional to the ratio of detector efficiencies [the first term in 
equation (2.11)] which is a constant. The second term in equation (2.11) is simply the 
ratio of the epithermal neutron source to the fast neutron source. The number of 
epithermal source neutrons relative to the number of fast neutrons entering the system 
(Sepi/SfastM) is a characteristic of the source and makes this term essentially a constant. 
The total resonance escape probability formed by pepipth, the leakage probabilities for 
the three energy groups and the neutron multiplication are the quantities that will change 
the bare/FFM ratio. These quantities are a function of the system geometry and the 
composition of the measured material. They are sensitive to the quantity of resonance 
and thermal absorbers including fissile isotopes (235U, 239Pu). With an increase of the 
fissile content in the material, more thermal neutrons will be absorbed and more fission 
events will occur. Consequently, counts in the bare FC are expected to decrease while 
counts in the FFM are expected to increase with increasing fissile content. Thus, the 
 38 
 
bare/FFM ratio is expected to be lower for larger fissile content in the measured 
material. 
The relationship for the (Gd-Cd) to FFM FCs ratio is derived using equations 
(2.9), (2.10) and (2.7). This ratio is given by: 
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(2.12) 
The first term in this ratio is simply the ratio of the efficiencies between the Gd-covered 
FC and the FFM which is a constant. The second term is again the ratio of the epithermal 
neutron source to the fast neutron source which is also essentially a constant. The third 
term is the ratio of the epithermal leakage probability before Cd cutoff to the fast leakage 
probability which would be a constant for samples of similar geometry. Similar to the 
bare to FFM ratio, the (Gd-Cd)/FFM ratio depends on the constants Sepi/SfastM. The ratio 
will be sensitive to the resonance escape probability for a neutron to escape resonances 
between the Cd and Gd cutoffs (1 – PENL_Gd). Contrary to the Cd-covered FC, the counts 
recorded by the Gd-covered FC are sensitive to the amount of absorbers having 
resonances between 0.13 eV and 1.25 eV – for example 239Pu with its large 0.3 eV 
resonance. Thus, the (Gd-Cd)/FFM ratio is mostly sensitive to absorbers that have 
resonances within this energy window. With increasing of fissile content that has 
resonances in the (Gd-Cd) energy window, the counts recorded in the window are 
expected to decrease due to neutron absorption in the resonances. In addition, the 
number of fission events is expected to increase with the fissile content. Consequently, it 
is expected that the (Gd-Cd)/FFM ratio be lower for higher fissile content. 
The Gd to FFM ratio is given by the following relationship: 
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(2.13) 
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As with previous ratios, the relative detector efficiencies, the epithermal leakage to fast 
leakage relationship, and the ratio of source neutrons are constants. The Gd to FFM ratio 
is primarily influenced by the resonance escape probability from epithermal to Gd cutoff 
and will depend on the quantity of absorbers in the measured material that have 
resonances above the Gd cutoff energy. With increasing of fissile content, the counts 
recorded in the Gd FC are expected to decrease due to neutron absorption in epithermal 
resonances. In addition, the number of fission events is expected to increase with the 
fissile content. Consequently, it is expected that the Gd/FFM ratio be lower for higher 
fissile content. 
The Gd to Cd ratio is given by 
    
   
 
   
   
     
      
        
                 
(2.14) 
This is the simplest of the ratios since it essentially only depends on the change in the 
resonance escape probability from the Cd to Gd cutoff energies. As the quantity of 
absorber in this region increases (due to increased 239Pu or 235U content), then this ratio 
is expected to increase proportionally to this change.  
 
 
2.4. Features Used in MCNP Simulations 
The simulations performed during this research have been performed using 
MCNP. MCNP is a numerical tool largely used for nuclear engineering applications. It 
uses the Monte Carlo method to track particles from birth to death. MCNP generates 
random numbers which are used to determine the distance a particle will travel or which 
interaction will occur [26]. The advantages that MCNP presents over a deterministic 
code are: (1) the simulation uses detailed physics and can simulate very complex 
geometries, (2) the sampling is continuous for energy and angle, (3) the MCNP solution 
is given only at the locations the user requests, and (4) a statistical error is associated 
with the solution. An example of input file is included in Appendix B. 
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2.4.1. MCNP tallies 
A tally in MCNP specifies which physical value to be calculated by the code. 
This research uses the neutron flux averaged over a surface (F2 tally) and the neutron 
flux averaged over a cell (F4 tally), both in units of neutrons/cm2. The F2 tally has been 
used to determine the neutron spectrum emerging from the neutron source. It was used 
along with an energy binning card (e2 card) to record the neutron spectrum for several 
energy bins separately. As the computational time increases with the number of energy 
bins, it is important to choose relevant bins. Each tally calculated is normalized by the 
number of source particles run for the simulation. In addition, a relative error is 
associated with each tally result. The internal MCNP statistical checks on the tally are 
used to evaluate the quality of a simulation. For instance, the relative error of the F2 or 
F4 tally should be less than 5% to be considered statistically acceptable [26].  
The F4 tally can also be modified with an FM4 card to get a reaction rate in units 
of reactions/cm3 [26]. This modified F4 card has been used to calculate the fission rate in 
the FCs and the (n,p) reaction rate in the 3He tubes. It has been assumed that each 
reaction occurring in the detector gives a count. To be able to compare a reaction rate 
from an MCNP simulation to a count rate experimentally recorded, the calculated 
reaction rate has to be normalized by the source strength used experimentally (in units 
of n/s). 
 
2.4.2. MCNP source definitions 
In the instrument designed, two 252Cf sources supply neutrons. These two sources 
are modeled as point sources in MCNP. The sources are defined with an SDEF card 
specifying the position of the sources and their energy distribution. The watt fission 
spectrum for 252Cf MCNP feature was used to create the neutron energy spectrum 
emitted from spontaneous fission of 252Cf. As a default in MCNP, the two sources are 
considered isotropic [26]. 
To reduce the total computational time required, a surface source write (SSW) 
card has been used. The SSW capability of MCNP allows the user to record the particles 
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that cross a defined surface with their position, direction and energy [26]. For the 
simulations performed for this research, a SSW has been created at the front face of the 
source pod. Thus, for simulations with the material and the detector, the recorded surface 
source replaces the modeled source. This effectively allows for dividing the simulation 
into two simulations: one to transport the neutrons from the 252Cf sources to the front 
surface of the source pod and then a second simulation to transport the neutrons from the 
front surface of the source pod to the detectors. This technique has the advantage of 
allowing resampling for changes in the detector pod to be made without needing to 
repeat the source calculation.  
 
2.4.3. S(α,β) feature 
The scattering law S(α,β) is essential to get a correct answer in problems 
involving neutron thermalization with molecules and crystalline solids [26]. For this type 
of materials, it is considered that neutrons of energies less than 4 eV interact with the 
entire molecule and not with the elements of the molecule separately. An MT card is 
used in MCNP to reflect this scattering of low energy neutrons in the model. This 
scattering law is used for UHMWPE. Figure 2.7 shows the effect of this scattering law in 
MCNP. This figure has been generated with MCNP Visual Editor and shows fast 
neutrons in red and thermal neutrons in blue. The two dense red areas correspond to the 
location of the two 252Cf source where mostly fast neutrons are born. The scattering law 
in UHMWPE considerably increases the number of thermal neutrons that we can see in 
the neutron source. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 2.7. Neutrons generated by the neutron source (a) without and (b) with 
MCNP scattering law in UHMWPE 
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3. VALIDATION OF THE INSTRUMENT AND MODEL WITH FRESH FUEL 
 
To validate the MCNP model of the instrumentation, experiments have been 
conducted using prototypes of the source system and SINRD detector pod. First, the 
source system alone, and then the detector pod with the source system were tested. 
Based on the configuration used in the experiment, MCNP simulations using the same 
geometric setup as the experiment were performed. The results obtained from the 
simulations were compared to the experimental ones.  
 
 
3.1. Validation of the Source Model 
3.1.1. Experimental procedure 
Bare, Gd-covered and Cd-covered detectors were used to record count rates for 
different neutron energy ranges. The bare detector records counts from thermal neutrons 
(below 0.13 eV). Gd and Cd-covered detector records counts from epithermal neutrons 
(above 0.13 eV for Gd and 1.25 eV for Cd). Because of their high efficiency, 3He tubes 
have been chosen to perform this validation. According to preliminary MCNP 
simulations, it was determined that a 12-hour counting time would give uncertainties in 
counts less than 0.06%. These uncertainties were considered low enough to be able to 
validate the source system model. The following experimental procedure was used: 
1) Measure at the same time the response of a bare, Gd-covered and Cd-covered 
3He tubes to background radiation during 30 minutes. 
2) Setup the three detectors in front of the source system and measure their 
response for 12 hours. 
Figure 3.1 shows the experimental setup of the detectors with the source 
system (a) and the corresponding model (b). The centers of the detectors were aligned in 
front of the face of the source system at 3.75 cm. The Cd and Gd detectors centers were 
respectively 3.14-cm and 2.98-cm distant from the bare detector. The geometric setup 
was chosen in order to maximize the solid angle from which the detectors see the source 
 44 
 
system. The closer the detectors are from the front of the source, the larger the solid 
angle and the larger the number of neutrons entering the detectors. The material 
constraints were also considered to determine the geometric setup. The 3He tubes were 
all of the same type (see section 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Setup to validate the model of the source: (a) experimental setup, and 
(b) model of the experimental setup 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Comparison between MCNP and experimental detector response 
Figure 3.29 shows the count rates recorded by the detectors during the experiment 
as well as the count rates calculated using MCNP. Since the Gd and Cd filter absorbs a 
part of the thermal neutrons detected by the bare detector, it is expected to observe count 
rates lower from Gd and Cd-covered detectors compared to the bare detector, and higher 
from Gd compared to Cd-covered detector. 
The comparison between calculated and measured 3He tubes response to the 
source shows a higher count rate recorded in the experiment compared to the simulation. 
                                                 
 
9 On this figure, the error bars are too small to be visualized. 
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This may be due to neutrons reflected back into the system from shielding, the walls of 
the room, the table where the material was set up, and other extraneous materials. None 
of these details were modeled in the MCNP simulation. The MCNP to experiment count 
rates ratios for bare, Gd and Cd detectors are respectively 0.858 ± 0.003, 0.911 ± 0.003, 
and 0.922 ± 0.003. These results demonstrate a good agreement between the calculated 
and measured count rates and it was determined that the MCNP source system 
sufficiently accurately models the physics of the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Count rates measured and calculated at the front face of the source 
system 
 
 
 
3.2. Validation of the Detector Model 
3.2.1. Instrumentation setup 
To validate the MCNP model of the complete instrument (detector pod and 
source pod), a comparison between MCNP simulations and experiments both using fresh 
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fuel were performed. Cans with U of different enrichments (0.31 wt%, 0.71 wt%, 1.94 
wt%, 2.95 wt%, and 4.46 wt%) were assayed. An empty can was also available for 
normalization purposes. The different enrichment as well as the dimensions and the 
materials used for the U can models and experiment follow standard Reference Materials 
EC-NRM-171/NBS-SRM-969 [42, 43]. These U can standards contain 200.1 g of U3O8 
powder pressed in a 7.0 cm-diameter cylinder of height 1.5 cm (2 cm for 4.46% enriched 
U can). The density of U3O8 in the can is 2.60 g/cm
3 (3.47 g/cm3 for 4.46% enriched U 
can) [42].  
The can is made from ASTM 6061-T6 aluminum alloy containing impurities like 
silicon (Si), magnesium (Mg), iron (Fe) and copper (Cu).  The top part of the can 
contains ultrasonic sensors and a plug for safeguards purposes. Each sample can has a 
unique ultrasonic spectrum [42]. This top part of the can was not modeled in MCNP and 
has been left as void in the model.  The metallic components of the ultrasonic sensors 
have negligible effects on the neutron flux. Figure 3.3 shows a picture of the U can 
standard (a) and its MCNP model (b). 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.3. U can standard: (a) picture of the can and (b) MCNP model of the can 
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To optimize the number of neutrons that leave the source and react with the 
material as well as the number of neutrons that enter the detector pod, the neutron source 
and the detector pod have to be placed as close as possible to the measured material. For 
the measurements, the U can is located at 0.7 cm from the detector pod and the source 
pod. Either FCs or 3He tubes10 were used in the detector pod. The center of the FCs and 
3He tubes is aligned with the center of the U part of the can and with the center of the 
neutron source pod. Figure 3.4 shows the three components in the experiment setup (a) 
and the corresponding MCNP model (b). 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.4. Instrumentation setup: (a) experimental setup and (b) corresponding 
model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
10 The high efficiency of 3He tubes compensates the absence of fissile material (235U) in the SINRD 
detector pod. 
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3.2.2. Experimental procedure 
The estimate of the measurement counting time is an important part of the 
experiment preparation. It is not desired that the counting time be too long because all 
the measurements have to be performed in a feasible time. At the same time, the 
counting time should not be too short because of large uncertainties concerns. It has been 
decided that the uncertainty of counts should be at most 3%.  
The fewest counts obtained during preliminary MCNP simulations have been 
used to estimate the counting time needed to perform experimental measurements. The 
fewest counts (2.18951e-8 fissions/source particle) have been recorded by the bare FC 
when measurement of the 4.46 wt% 235U can was simulated. Assuming 2.95e+05 n/s are 
emitted by each 252Cf source, a 24-hour counting time is needed to get an uncertainty 
less or equal to 3% for each FC and for every can interrogated. The uncertainty in the 
counts recorded is estimated by the square root of the counts. 
The experimental procedure using bare, FFM, Cd-covered, and Gd-covered 
detectors is the following: 
1) Setup detectors (FCs and 3He tubes) and verify the response to make sure all 
pieces of equipment perform as expected. 
2) Put the FCs in SINRD instrument and record counts for 24 hours successively 
without any material, with the empty aluminum can, with the 0.31 wt%, 
0.71 wt%, 1.94 wt%, 2.95 wt% and 4.46 wt% 235U uranium cans. 
3) Repeat step 3 replacing FCs by 3He tubes. 
The Canberra Lynx Digital Signal Analyzer [44] coupled with the Genie-2000 
software [45] was used to record counts from the detectors.  Each FC (or 3He tube) was 
connected to the Lynx via a pre-amplifier; the same type of electronics was used for each 
detector. However, the electronic noise due to the cables used and the electronics 
themselves can be different for each detector. Getting the neutron spectrum from each 
detector, the gain and the low energy noise were adjusted independently for each 
detector according to the theoretical shapes of 3He tube and FC spectra [46]. To make 
 49 
 
sure that the geometry of the material setup stays the same for each measurement, 
markers have been placed on the experiment table. 
 
3.2.3. Comparison of experimental measurements to MCNP results 
 
Figure 3.5. shows the calculated and experimental count rates from 3He tubes 
placed in the SINRD detector pod11. For the bare, FFM, Gd and Cd detectors, the 
percentage difference between MCNP and measurements are respectively 46% ± 1%, 
24% ± 1%, 31% ± 1% and 12% ± 1%. The Cd detector shows the closest agreement 
between simulation and experiment whereas the bare detector shows the biggest 
difference in count rates. However, the count rates trend is comparable for calculated 
and measured data for each detector. Analyzing the bare and FFM count rates from 
simulation and experiment, it is possible to conclude that the simulations contain more 
thermal neutrons and the experiment more fast neutrons. 
The difference between experimental measurements and MCNP results can first 
be attributed to the Cf sources: the location, geometry, energy spectrum and distribution 
of the sources are causes of bias. The simulation also does not account for any 
electronics error. In addition, bias concerning the detectors can occur with the location of 
the detector within the SINRD pod and the efficiency of the detectors. The actual 
thickness of the Gd and Cd filter, the presence of extraneous material and the room 
returning neutrons also introduced differences between simulation and experimental 
results. Finally, the machining of the materials for the experiment has certain tolerances 
that introduce bias in measurement as well. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
11 Because of equipment issues, the experimental results with FCs were inconclusive and are thus not 
discussed. However, MCNP results using FCs show a usable SINRD signature that could be compared to 
experimental results. 
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Figure 3.5. MCNP and Experimental count rates for different U can enrichment 
with bare, FFM, Gd and Cd 3He tubes 
 
 
 
To cancel bias in the simulations and experiment, both results have been 
normalized to the empty can data. The calculated to experimental (C/E) ratios have then 
been calculated for each SINRD ratio and for each detector, with and without 
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normalization. In the case where the MCNP simulations exactly model the experiment, 
the C/E ratio would be equal to one for each SINRD ratio and each can measured.  
Figure 3.6 shows the calculated to experimental results for SINRD ratios without 
and with normalization to empty can SINRD ratios. The C/E ratios plotted without 
normalization to empty can (upper plot of the figure) shows different multiplying factors 
for the different SINRD ratios: the C/E ratios appear to be between 0.5 and 6. However, 
the normalization to the empty can case (bottom plot of the figure) brings all the C/E 
ratios close to one: C/E ratios range is reduced to 0.75 and 1.35. Thus, the normalization 
of ratios to the empty can case is necessary to get the simulations and the measurements 
in agreement: the MCNP model of SINRD accurately simulates the physics of the 
experiment. 
 
3.2.4. SINRD response to different 235U content 
From the four count rates recorded by the bare, Gd, Cd, and B4C FCs, different 
ratios can be calculated to analyze SINRD response. It is desirable to use ratios which 
show a trend as a function of fissile content with relatively low uncertainties. For the 
case of U cans, the normalized bare to FFM as well as the Gd to bare ratios provide the 
best SINRD signatures. These two ratios versus 235U content are shown on Figure 3.7. 
Simulations with more particles will decrease the error bar of each data point and give a 
more precise trend for these ratios. 
When measuring an unknown can, having two ratios to analyze present the 
advantage to compare the estimated mass of 235U from each ratio separately and to then 
compare the results; this comparison can be useful to confirm the estimate and/or reduce 
the uncertainty of the estimate. 
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Figure 3.6. Calculated to experimental results for ratios of count rates without 
normalization (upper plot) and with normalization (bottom plot) 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 3.7. Normalized bare/FFM and Gd/bare ratios versus 235U content 
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4. ANALYSIS OF 239PU-BEARING MATERIALS 
 
The comparison between simulation and experiment results from irradiation of U 
cans (section 3) has shown that the MCNP model of the source and SINRD is accurately 
simulating the physics. The previous section has also shown that the instrument is able to 
quantify the 235U content of fresh fuel. As 239Pu is the fissile isotope of interest in 
pyroprocessing materials, preliminary simulations on 239Pu-bearing materials have been 
performed: the analysis of an artificial Pu cylinder was performed to evaluate the ability 
of the instrument to quantify 239Pu content in a material; then, calculations on a Cd-ingot 
were performed to analyze a pyroprocessing material. 
 
 
4.1. Preliminary Analysis on a Pu Cylinder  
4.1.1. Material measured 
First, the instrument was tested on an artificial Pu cylinder – i.e. this material 
does not correspond to any pyroprocessing materials.  Pyroprocessing materials are 
heterogeneous which motivated the use of two different densities of Pu in the cylinder. 
As Pu metal has a density of 19.8 g/cm3, the densities to use had to be less than Pu 
metal: 16 g/cm3 and 8 g/cm3 were chosen. The Pu cylinder was composed of a 1-cm 
radius inner cylinder with a density of 16 g/cm3 and by an outer cylinder with a radius 
three times bigger and a density of 8 g/cm3. This cylinder represents approximately 
2.6 kg of Pu which is less than the 10.5-kg Pu critical mass. 
The Pu cylinder contains the following isotopes: 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, and 
242Pu, which are the typical Pu isotopes found in spent fuel. The inner and outer 
cylinders have been chosen with the same Pu isotopic composition and differ only by 
their density. Using Oak Ridge Isotope Generation (ORIGEN2) [47] code, the Pu 
isotopic composition of spent fuel from the irradiation of 1.0 MT of natural U fuel in a 
Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor to a burnup of 4500 MWd/MTU at a 
specific power of 15.0 W/g was subjectively taken as a basis for the Pu cylinder. For 
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varying 239Pu enrichments (between 0 and 80 at%) with the 240Pu content accounting for 
the remainder, MCNP simulations of the instrument with Pu cylinders were performed. 
Table 4.1 lists the different Pu isotopic composition used for the Pu cylinder to test the 
instrument.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1. Pu cylinder isotopic compositon with different 239Pu content used to test 
the instrument  
Composition 
# 
Pu isotope content (at%) 
238
Pu 
239
Pu 
240
Pu 
241
Pu 
242
Pu 
1 0.079% 80.004% 10.661% 8.363% 0.893% 
2 0.079% 75.610% 15.055% 8.363% 0.893% 
3 0.079% 65.998% 24.667% 8.363% 0.893% 
4 0.079% 50.610% 40.055% 8.363% 0.893% 
5 0.079% 35.611% 55.054% 8.363% 0.893% 
6 0.079% 12.611% 78.054% 8.363% 0.893% 
7 0.079% 3.611% 87.054% 8.363% 0.893% 
8 0.079% 0.000% 90.665% 8.363% 0.893% 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Use of hafnium  
In previous research on SINRD [18], the use of an Hf filter added to the Gd-
covered FC has been proven to increase the detector signature for 239Pu quantification. In 
fact, Hf absorbs neutrons of energy around 1 eV. This energy corresponds to a resonance 
in the 240Pu total cross section. Without Hf, the neutrons being absorbed by 240Pu will 
reduce the number of fissions occurring in the detector in the Gd-Cd energy cutoff 
window. A low count rate recorded in this energy window would be interpreted as a 
large amount of 239Pu whereas 240Pu absorption would actually be the cause. Figure 4.1 
shows the 0.3 eV resonance of 239Pu fission cross section, the 1 eV resonance of Hf and 
240Pu total cross section. Gd-covered FC is the only FC detecting 1 eV neutrons and is 
thus the only one affected by the addition of Hf. 
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Figure 4.1. 239Pu fission cross section and 240Pu and Hf total cross section 
 
 
 
To determine how much Hf is needed to absorb neutron of energies 
corresponding to the 1-eV resonance in 240Pu total cross section, MCNP simulations 
have been performed on one Pu cylinder. The Pu isotopic composition #2 from Table 4.1 
was chosen for the material.  The neutron fluxes from the Pu cylinder through 1-mm, 2-
mm and 3-mm Hf plates were compared to the neutron flux recorded without any Hf 
plate. Only the influence of Hf in the energy bin containing the 240Pu resonance 
(0.8 eV – 1.2 eV) was investigated by comparing neutron fluxes. The geometry used for 
these simulations is shown on Figure 4.2. To cancel the effect of the 240Pu resonance, the 
Hf thickness which decreases the neutron flux the most in the energy window 0.8 eV- 
1.2 eV is the optimal thickness. 
 
 
 
1.0E+00
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-05
C
ro
ss
 s
e
ct
io
n
 (
b
ar
n
s)
 
Neutron energy (MeV) 
Hf total cross section
239Pu fission cross section
240Pu total cross section
Hf total cross section 
 
239  i i   i  
 
240Pu total cross section 
 57 
 
 
Figure 4.2. MCNP simulation to investigate the optimal Hf thickness 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the percentage of reduction of the neutron flux induced by the 
addition of 1-mm, 2-mm and 3-mm thick Hf plates.  Only the neutron flux in the energy 
window 0.8 eV -1.2 eV has been analyzed in these simulations. The 3-mm thick Hf 
reduces the neutron flux the most in the 240Pu 1-eV resonance thus, 3-mm thick Hf 
should be used to cancel the 240Pu resonance effect on the detector signature. However, 
the difference between adding 2-mm thick Hf and 3-mm thick Hf is relatively small. For 
cost concerns, 2-mm Hf has been stated as enough to cancel the effect of 240Pu to 
quantify 239Pu in a material. In the following, all simulations have been performed 
wrapping the Gd-covered FC in 2-mm thick Hf. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Reduction of original flux for different Hf thicknesses 
Hf thickness (mm) 1 2 3 
Reduction of original flux (%) 71.24 89.19 95.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
4.1.3. SINRD response to different 239Pu content 
The different isotopic compositions of the Pu cylinder developed in section 4.1.1 
were simulated in MCNP to evaluate the ability of instrument to quantify 239Pu; the 
geometry of the simulation is shown on Figure 4.3. Fission rates from the bare, Gd-
covered, Cd-covered, and FFM detectors were recorded and ratios of these count rates 
were then calculated to evaluate the SINRD response. The fission rates obtained 
measuring the Pu cylinder without 239Pu (composition #8 from Table 4.1) were used for 
normalization purposes. The best SINRD signature has been recorded by the normalized 
bare/FFM and Gd/bare ratios from U and Pu FCs.  
Figure 4.4 shows these two ratios for SINRD configuration with U FCs only and 
U and Pu FCs. The bare/FFM ratio shows the same signature for both configurations as 
they both use the same type of FCs; however, the Gd/bare ratio shows a slope twice as 
big for U and Pu FCs compared to U FCs only. Thus, the best SINRD signature is 
obtained from the instrument using U and Pu FCs. The normalized FFM count rate could 
also be used in addition of the bare/FFM and Gd/bare ratio to confirm the estimate of 
239Pu content in the material. Comparing different estimates from different trends could 
also decrease the uncertainty of the estimate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Geometry of MCNP simulations with Pu cylinder 
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(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.4. Normalized Gd/bare (a) and bare/FFM (b) ratios versus 239Pu content 
for SINRD using U FCs only and U and Pu FCs 
 
 
 
A test simulation has been run in MCNP to evaluate the precision of the 239Pu 
content estimate from the normalized bare/FFM and Gd/bare ratios, and normalized 
FFM count rate. A Pu cylinder containing 638.6 g of 239Pu has been simulated with the 
instrument. The SINRD ratios and count rates for this sample supposed unknown have 
been analyzed.  
Figure 4.5 shows the data from this unknown plotted on the normalized 
bare/FFM, Gd/bare or normalized FFM count rate trends obtained from previous 
simulations. On the figure, the data from the unknown has been represented by a plain 
red horizontal line; the dash lines represent the uncertainty associated with each data. To 
estimate the 239Pu content of the sample, the smallest and highest masses corresponding 
to data with uncertainty of the unknown have been calculated; the average of these two 
masses gives the estimate of the 239Pu content and the difference between the masses and 
this average gives the uncertainty of the estimate. 
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(a) (b) 
 
 
(c)  
 
Figure 4.5. Normalized bare/FFM, Gd/bare and FFM count rate from the unknown 
Pu cylinder 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the 239Pu content estimate for the unknown Pu cylinder using the 
results from the normalized bare/FFM and Gd/bare ratios separately, the weighted 
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average of the ratios estimates, the normalized FFM count rate alone, and finally the 
weighted average of the ratios and the count rate estimates. The result with the smallest 
percent difference compared to the theoretical mass of 239Pu represented in bold is the 
best estimate of the fissile content of the unknown. These results show that the 
instrument is able to determine accurately the 239Pu content of an artificial Pu cylinder. 
In addition, due to the linear trend of the normalized FFM count rate and the Gd/bare 
ratio as a function of 239Pu content, the highest the fissile content, the lowest the relative 
uncertainty. Due to the logarithmic trend of the bare/FFM ratio, the results from this 
ratio only give more precise estimate for small 239Pu content. Table 4.3 also shows that 
the comparison of the results from the two ratios can help increasing the accuracy of the 
estimate. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Estimate of 239Pu content for the unknown sample using different trends 
Trend used 
Unknown  239Pu content estimate 
mass (g) uncertainty % diff. 
Bare/FFM 645.4 104.7 1.07 % 
Gd/bare 574.3 346.0 10.07 % 
Both ratios 639.5 100.2 0.14 % 
FFM count 
rate 
627.2 232.9 1.79 % 
Ratios and 
count rate 
637.6 92.0 0.19 % 
 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of Cd-Ingot from Electrorefiner 
The instrument response to irradiation of an artificial Pu cylinder has shown that 
it is capable to measure 239Pu content of the cylinder with a relatively small uncertainty. 
To test the instrument on a realistic material from pyroprocessing process, simulations 
with Cd-ingot from the electrorefiner LLC have been performed. These simulations will 
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lead to conclusions about the capability of the instrument to measure 239Pu content in 
pyroprocessing material. 
 
4.2.1. EBR-II spent fuel isotopic composition 
The characteristics of the Cd ingot from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
(JAEA) [40] were considered to perform MCNP simulation on a pyroprocessing 
material. The LCC used in JAEA was 2.5 cm in diameter. The Cd ingot obtained at the 
end of the electrorefining step contained 120 g of Cd and 14.7 g of Pu mixed with U 
[40]. The amount of each actinide in the metal product for Pu electrotransport is shown 
on Table 4.4. In order to get the isotopic composition of these actinides, a MCNPX 
burnup calculation was performed on an EBR-II model. It is assumed that the isotopic 
actinide composition in the Cd ingot is the same as the actinide composition of the EBR-
II spent fuel. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Actinide composition of the metal product for Pu electrotransport 
Element wt% 
Uranium (U) 33.8 
Neptunium (Np) 4.0 
Plutonium (Pu) 55.6 
Americium (Am) 6.4 
Curium (Cm) 0.2 
 
 
 
During its operation time, the EBR-II had been loaded with several type of fuel 
pin. To perform the burnup calculation, the Mark-V [48, 38] fuel type was used in an 
EBR-II MCNP model. Table 4.5 shows some characteristics of this type of fuel pin. The 
fuel rod is composed by U (63% enriched), Pu and zirconium (Zr) and is bonded by 
sodium for thermo-hydraulics purposes. An MCNP model of the EBR-II fuel pin is 
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shown on Figure C.1 in Appendix C. The model of the fuel pin has been designed with a 
0.44-cm diameter fuel rod surrounded by 0.1 cm of sodium bond and with a 0.381-cm 
thick cladding. The core and its assemblies have a hexagonal lattice structure. The 
outside assemblies are made of depleted uranium and form the blanket. Pu is produced in 
the blanket during the reactor operation explaining the term breeder reactor: the reactor 
produces more Pu than it consumes. The EBR-II had been operated with different 
numbers of blanket and fuel assemblies, each containing 61 or 91 pins [49, 50]. For the 
purposes of the simulation, a small core representing an EBR-II MCNP model was 
created with 7 fuel assemblies and 12 blanket assemblies, each with 91 pins per 
assembly. This MCNP core model is shown on Figure C.2  in Appendix C. To obtain the 
regular 1% Pu in the blanket at discharge, as found in literature [48], a burnup 
calculation was performed on the MCNP model burning the fuel for 370 days at a power 
of 62.5 MW and letting it decay for 730 days. This simulation gave a typical actinide 
isotopic composition from irradiation of metal fuel in the EBR-II. This result is shown in 
Appendix D. Knowing that the Cd ingot is formed by 120 g of Cd and 14.7 g of Pu 
mixed with U with the same actinide isotopic composition of EBR-II spent fuel, the 
composition of the Cd ingot is deduced taking into account the data in Table 4.4.  
 
 
  
Table 4.5. Characteristics of the Mark-V fuel pin 
Fuel alloy (wt%) U-20Pu-10Zr 
Heavy metal density (g/cm3) 14.1 – 14.3 
Slug diameter (cm) 0.427 – 0.439 
Plenum ot fuel volume ratio 1.45 
Plenum gas Argon 
Cladding material HT 9 steel 
Pin length (cm) 34.3 
Blanket Depleted uranium (DU): UO2 form 
 
 
 64 
 
4.2.2. SINRD response to different 239Pu content 
To see how the material influenced the neutron flux originally transmitted by the 
source system, MCNP tally calculations have been performed after the Cd ingot; the Cd 
ingot bearing 50% of 239Pu has been chosen as an example. The neutron fluxes before 
and after the material are shown on Figure 4.6. The two fluxes have a similar shape. 
However, the magnitude of the neutron flux after the material is lower due to absorption 
of neutrons in the Cd-ingot. The original flux is more depleted after the material for 
energies corresponding to the (Gd-Cd window) due to 239Pu resonance at 0.3eV. It is 
also more depleted in the whole epithermal region due to the numerous resonances 
present in this energy group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Neutron flux before and after the Cd ingot with 50 at% of 239Pu 
 
 
 
MCNP simulations have been run for several 239Pu contents in the Cd ingot. The 
results from measurement of the Cd ingot without 239Pu were used for normalization 
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purposes. Figure 4.7 show the configuration of the source, the detector, and the Cd ingot 
used for MCNP simulations. Over all ratios calculated from SINRD data, the normalized 
Cd/FFM and bare/FFM ratios provides the best SINRD signatures. Figure 4.8 shows 
these ratio plotted versus the 239Pu content of the Cd ingot using: (1) U FCs for every 
detector of SINRD, and (2) U FCs for the bare and FFM detectors of SINRD and Pu FCs 
covered with Gd or Cd. Using U and Pu FCs instead of only U FCs increases SINRD 
signature by 50%: the slope of the Cd/FFM for U and Pu FCs is 1.5 times the slope for U 
FCs only. However, the bare/FFM ratio shows the same signature for U FCs or U and Pu 
FCs as U FCs are used in both cases for these two detectors. Thus, considering both 
Cd/FFM and bare/FFM ratios to measure the 239Pu content of a Cd ingot, U and Pu FCs 
record the best SINRD signature.  
On Figure 4.8, the Cd/FFM and bare/FFM ratios plateau out for a 239Pu content 
superior to respectively 48 g and 67 g. This is due to shelf-shielding effects occurring 
from saturation of the large 239Pu resonance at low energy. For a 239Pu content greater 
than 48 g, the Cd/FFM ratio alone will not be sufficient to determine this fissile isotope 
content with a relatively small uncertainty (and similarly for 67 g with bare/FFM ratio); 
the normalized FFM count rate could then be used to confirm or determine the 239Pu 
content of an ingot as its trend is linear as a function of the 239Pu content; the graph of 
normalized FFM count rate versus 239Pu content is shown on Figure 4.9. Comparing 
results from the two ratios and from the normalized FFM count rate makes possible to 
reduce the uncertainty of the estimate of 239Pu content. According to the trend of the 
Cd/FFM and bare/FFM ratios versus the 239Pu content, a measurement of an unknown 
Cd ingot with the instrument will give an estimate of the 239Pu content with a relative 
uncertainty between 48 and 6 % (given that the uncertainty of the measurement is the 
same as the data points of the trend). When unable to use these two ratios, the 
normalized FFM will give an estimate of the 239Pu content with a relative uncertainty 
between 21 and 8 %. 
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Figure 4.7. MCNP model of the measurement with Cd ingot 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.8. Normalized (a) Cd/FFM ratio and (b) bare/FFM ratio from SINRD with 
U FCs only and U+Pu FCs for Cd ingot with different 239Pu content  
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Figure 4.9. Normalized FFM count rate versus Cd ingot 239Pu content 
 
 
 
Test simulations have been run in MCNP to evaluate the precision of the 239Pu 
content estimate from the normalized bare/FFM and Cd/FFM ratios, and normalized 
FFM count rate. Cd ingots containing respectively 13.6 and 102.2 g of 239Pu have been 
simulated with the instrument and the SINRD ratios and count rates have been analyzed. 
The two samples are respectively called “unknown 1” and “unknown 2” in the 
following.  
Figure 4.10 shows the data from the two unknowns plotted on the bare/FFM, 
Cd/FFM or normalized FFM count rate trends obtained from previous simulations; the 
top plots of the figure shows data from unknown 1 whereas the bottom ones are data 
from unknown 2. On the figure, the data from the unknowns has been represented by a 
plain red horizontal line; the dash lines represent the uncertainty associated with each 
data. To estimate the 239Pu content of each sample, the smallest and highest masses 
corresponding to the data with their uncertainty have been calculated; the average of 
these two masses gives the estimate of the 239Pu content and the difference between the 
masses and the average gives the uncertainty.  
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
Figure 4.10. Analysis of data from unknown 1 ((a) and (b)) and unknown 2 ((c) and 
(d)) 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows the 239Pu content estimate for the two unknowns using the 
results from the bare/FFM and Cd/FFM ratios separately, their weighted average, the 
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normalized FFM count rate alone, and finally the weighted average of the ratios and the 
count rate estimates. The result with the smallest percent difference compared to the 
theoretical mass of 239Pu represented in bold is the best estimate of the fissile content of 
the unknowns. These results show that the instrument is able to determine accurately the 
239Pu content of a Cd ingot; in addition, due to the linear trend of the normalized FFM 
count rate as a function of 239Pu content, the highest the fissile content, the lowest the 
relative uncertainty. Due to the logarithmic trend of the ratios, the results from the ratios 
only are more precise than from the normalized FFM count rate for small 239Pu content. 
Table 4.6 also shows that the comparison of the results from the two ratios helps 
increasing the accuracy of the estimate. 
 
 
 
Table 4.6. Estimate of unknowns’ 239Pu content for several trends 
Trend used 
Unknown 1 239Pu content estimate Unknown 2 239Pu content estimate 
mass (g) uncertainty % diff mass (g) uncertainty % diff 
Bare/FFM 13.0 5.2 4.25% 116.9 45.9 14.40% 
Cd/FFM 15.6 5.6 15.04% 90.4 31.6 13.06% 
Both ratios 14.2 3.8 4.58% 98.9 26.0 3.21% 
FFM count 
rate 
15.9 10.6 17% 102.6 10.8 0.38% 
Ratios and 
count rate 
14.4 3.6 6% 102.1 10.0 0.14% 
 
 
 
In summary, the simulations of the instrument measuring Cd ingots with 
different 239Pu content have shown that the normalized bare/FFM and the Cd/FFM ratios 
show the best SINRD signature. Due to their logarithmic trend, these ratios estimate 
large fissile contents with large uncertainties. To decrease these uncertainties in estimate, 
the normalized FFM count rate can be used. In addition, decreasing the uncertainty of 
the measurement by increasing the counting time and/or the source strength will 
contribute to decrease the uncertainty of the 239Pu content estimate. 
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5.      CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results from MCNP simulations and experimental measurements were used 
to investigate the use of SINRD to quantify 239Pu in the pyroprocessing process for 
safeguards purposes. The purpose of these simulations and measurements was to: (1) 
design an instrument using SINRD and (2) evaluate the capability of the instrument to 
measure fissile content in pyroprocessing material. The instrument is composed by a 
neutron source pod, creating a 1/E slowing down function to interrogate a material, and 
SINRD detector pod. SINRD uses ratios of different detectors to cancel most of the 
systematic errors related to calibration and positioning.  
From comparison between MCNP simulations and measurements using fresh 
fuel in a form of U cans, it has been concluded that the MCNP models accurately 
simulate the physics of the experiment. As fresh fuel contains a fissile isotope with a 
resonance at 0.3 eV (235U), the instrument behavior with fresh fuel is expected to be the 
same as measuring spent fuel.  A good agreement between results from simulations and 
measurements was only possible when the data was normalized to the empty can case: 
the normalization of SINRD results with a reference object of similar geometry is 
necessary to cancel bias errors and get accurate data. The normalized bare/FFM and 
Gd/bare ratios have been determined as the best SINRD signatures for quantification of 
235U in U cans. These results have been obtained using 3He tubes in the detector pod. 
Even if this type of detectors does not contain a fissile isotope sensitive to the fissile 
content of the interrogated material, its high efficiency makes possible to obtain usable 
data. 
Simulations on an artificial Pu cylinder and on a Cd ingot comparable to a 
pyroprocessing electrorefiner product were performed for various 239Pu contents. The 
SINRD ratios which showed the best signature for quantification of 239Pu content in Cd 
ingot were the normalized bare/FFM and the Cd/FFM ratios.  Both ratios level off for 
the highest 239Pu simulated due to saturation of the low-energy resonance of the fissile 
isotope. However, when an unknown is measured and analyzed using these ratios, the 
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weighted average of the different estimates makes it possible to reduce the uncertainty of 
the estimate. In addition, normalized count rate trend could also be used to determine, 
confirm or improve the estimate of fissile content in a material.  
The two simulations with unknown Cd ingots have shown that the SINRD 
instrument is capable of determining 239Pu content of the material, with relatively small 
uncertainties. However, improvements on the fissile content estimation will be possible 
by: (1) improving the trend of the normalized ratios by using more data points; (2) 
reducing the data point’s uncertainties by simulating more particles; and (3) reducing the 
measurement uncertainty of an unknown by simulating more particles. Experimentally, 
these improvements would be possible by increasing the source strength of the Cf 
sources used and/or increasing the counting time.  
An alternative design of the SINRD detector pod would be to use parallel FC 
plates. This design, similar to the one used in the 1969 SINRAD experiment [35], would 
considerably reduce the errors due to geometric setup of the instrument: each FCs would 
have same entering neutron flux. The bare FC plate would be the first one to detect 
neutrons; then, the Gd FC would detect neutrons of energy higher than 0.13 eV; the 
following Cd FC would detect neutrons of energy higher than 0.25 eV; finally a B4C FC 
will detect the fast neutrons of energy higher than 3.8 keV. This design would possibly 
make the normalization to object of similar dimensions not mandatory. 
This research has led to the conclusion that the SINRD instrument is a candidate 
for safeguarding pyroprocessing facilities. Future work includes performing 
experimental measurements using FCs, simulating the instrument response to other 
pyroprocessing materials, building a remote control prototype of the instrument for 
measurements in hot cells, and performing additional verification measurements on 
pyroprocessing material. Finally, the prototype of the instrument would have to be 
optimized to be used for safeguards.   
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APPENDIX A. DRAWINGS FOR THE DETECTOR POD PROTOTYPE 
MACHINING 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
Figure B.1. Drawings for Al block machining: (a) 3-D view, (b) x-y view, (c) x-z 
view and (d) y-z view  
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
Figure B.2. Drawings for UHMWPE block machining: (a) 3-D view, (b) x-y view, 
(c) x-z view and (d) y-z view 
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF MCNP INPUT FILE 
 
test instrument with U-can 2.95% U235 and lab FC 
c  
c ============ CELL CARDS ======================  
c  
c  
c ---------- neutron source ----------- 
100   4   -0.940  -100 +110 -111                       imp:n=1   $ Poly 
101   3   -8.908  -103 +104 +100 +110 -111 -105 +101   imp:n=1   $ Ni 
102   0           -103 +104 -101 +102 +110 -111 imp:n=1  $ Gd if needed 
c  
c ---------- U can 200.1g U3O8----------- 
200   22 -2.6   -201                 imp:n=1 
201   0         -202                 imp:n=1 
202   0         -203                 imp:n=1 
203   18 -6.826 -200 +201 +202 +203  imp:n=1    
c  
c ----------- detector -------------- 
300   14  -2.70  -300 +312 +333 +343 #304 #306 #307 #313 #323 #334 #344 
&  imp:n=1 trcl=1 $ Al box 
301   13  -1.45  -301 +300 #343 #304 #306 #307 imp:n=1 trcl=1 $ 1.0cm 
B4C Liner 
302   4   -0.94   -303 +322  +323 #305    imp:n=1 trcl=1  $ Poly Box 
303   2   -8.65   -302 +303  #305         imp:n=1 trcl=1 $ 1mm Cd Liner 
304   0           -304 +312 +313                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
305   0           -305 +322 +323                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
306   0           -306 +333 +334                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
307   0           -307 +343 +344                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
c bare U235 fission chamber 
310   24  -0.0059268  -310                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
311   15  -19.1       -311 +310            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
312   14  -2.70       -312 +311            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
313   14  -2.70       -313                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
c FFM U235 fission chamber 
320   24  -0.0059268  -320                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
321   15  -19.1       -321 +320            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
322   14  -2.70       -322 +321            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
323   4   -0.94       -323                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
c 0.1mm Gd covered U235 fission chamber 
330   24  -0.0059268  -330                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
331   15  -19.1       -331 +330            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
332   14  -2.70       -332 +331            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
333   5   -7.90       -333 +332            imp:n=1 trcl=1 
334   14  -2.70       -334                 imp:n=1 trcl=1 
c 3.0mm Cd covered U235 fission chamber 
340    24  -0.0059268 -340                imp:n=1 trcl=1 
341    15 -19.1       -341 +340           imp:n=1 trcl=1 
342    14 -2.70       -342 +341           imp:n=1 trcl=1 
343    2  -8.65       -343 +342           imp:n=1 trcl=1 
344    14 -2.70       -344                imp:n=1 trcl=1 
c  
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c ----------- tallies --------------- 
c 400    0     +13 -102 -103 +104 +110 -111       imp:n=1 $ SSW surface 
c  
c ---------- vacuum ----------------- 
900    0    -900 +200 #100 #101 #102 #300 #301 #302 #303 #304 #305 #306 
& #307 #310 #311 #312 #313 #320 #321 #322 #323 #330 #331 #332  
& #333 #334 #340 #341 #342 #343 #344 imp:n=1 
901    0     +900                             imp:n=0    
 
c  
c =========== SURFACE CARDS ==================== 
c  
c  
c ---------- neutron source surfaces ---------- 
100     SQ   +0.15 +0.03 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 
101     PX   -5                        
102     PX   -5.01                         $ surface of the source                 
103     PY   +5.7                           
104     PY   -5.7                           
105     PX   +0.0 
110     PZ   -6                              
111     PZ   6  
c  
c --------- U can surfaces -----   
200     RCC   -9.51 0 -1.239 0 0 8.898 3.5 
201     RCC   -9.51 0 -1.039 0 0 2.078 3.4935 
202     RCC   -9.51 0  4.039 0 0 2.42  3.3 
203     RCC   -9.51 0  6.459 0 0 1.2   3.4935 
c  
c ------------ detector surfaces -------------- 
c Detector box 
300    RPP  -17.45 -13.91 -16.08 16.08  -4.925 4.60 
301    RPP  -18.45 -13.91 -17.08 17.08  -5.925 5.60 
302    RPP  -23.35 -18.45 -17.08 17.08  -5.925 5.60 
303    RPP  -23.25 -18.45 -16.98 16.98  -5.825 5.50 
c holes to insert detectors 
304    RCC  -15.68 -14.225  0    0 31.305 0 1.37 
305    RCC  -20.80 -14.225  0    0 31.305 0 1.37 
306    RCC  -15.68 -14.225  2.98 0 31.305 0 1.38 
307    RCC  -15.68 -14.225 -3.14 0 31.305 0 1.67  
c Bare U235 fission chamber 
310    RCC  -15.68 -6.35 0 0 12.70 0 1.179996 
311    RCC  -15.68 -6.35 0 0 12.70 0 1.18 
312    RCC  -15.68 -7.81 0 0 15.62 0 1.27  
313    RCC  -15.68 -14.225 0 0 6.415 0 1.27 
c FFM fission chamber 
320    RCC  -20.80 -6.35 0 0 12.70 0 1.179996 
321    RCC  -20.80 -6.35 0 0 12.70 0 1.18 
322    RCC  -20.80 -7.81 0 0 15.62 0 1.27 
323    RCC  -20.80 -14.225 0 0 6.415 0 1.27    
c 0.1mm Gd covered fission chamber 
330    RCC  -15.68 -6.35  2.98 0 12.7  0 1.179955 
331    RCC  -15.68 -6.35  2.98 0 12.7  0 1.18 
332    RCC  -15.68 -7.81  2.98 0 15.62 0 1.27 
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333    RCC  -15.68 -7.81  2.98 0 15.62 0 1.28 
334    RCC  -15.68 -14.225 2.98 0 6.415 0 1.28  
c 3.0mm Cd covered fission chamber 
340    RCC -15.68 -6.35 -3.14 0 12.7  0 1.179955 
341    RCC -15.68 -6.35 -3.14 0 12.7  0 1.18 
342    RCC -15.68 -7.81 -3.14 0 15.62 0 1.27 
343    RCC -15.68 -7.81 -3.14 0 15.62 0 1.57 
344    RCC -15.68 -14.225 -3.14 0 6.415 0 1.57 
c  
c --------- surfaces for tallies -------------- 
13     PX   -5.51                          $ plane for SSW/SSR 
c  
c --------- surface for outside world ----------------- 
900     so   +100 
 
c  
c =========== DATA CARDS ======================== 
c  
c  
c -------- Source definition -----------  
MODE N 
SDEF ERG=D1 POS=D2 $ 2 point Cf sources, position 4.58 or -4.58 
SP1   -3 1.025 2.926      $ distribution for Cf n source 
SI2   L 0 4.58 0 0 -4.58 0 
SP2   D 1 1 
c SSR   PTY=N 
c  
c -------- Materials ----------------- 
c **** natural cadmium 8.65g/cc **** 
m2    48106.66c 0.012500   
      48108.66c 0.008900 
      48110.66c 0.124900   
      48111.66c 0.128000 
      48112.66c 0.241300 
      48113.66c 0.122200 
      48114.66c 0.287300 
      48116.66c 0.074900   
c **** natural nickel 8.908g/cc **** 
m3    28058.66c 0.680770   
      28060.66c 0.262230 
      28061.66c 0.011400 
      28062.66c 0.036340 
      28064.66c 0.009260  
c **** polyethylene C2H4 0.94g/cc **** 
m4     1001.66c 0.666567   
       1002.66c 0.000100 
       6000.66c 0.333333 
mt4    poly.10t 
c **** natural gadolinium 7.90g/cc **** 
m5    64152.66c 0.0020     
      64154.66c 0.0218   
      64155.66c 0.1480 
      64156.66c 0.2047 
      64157.66c 0.1565 
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      64158.66c 0.2484 
      64160.66c 0.2186 
c **** plutonium after irradiation **** 
m6    94238.66c 0.00079   
      94239.66c 0.75611 
      94240.66c 0.15055 
      94241.66c 0.08363 
      94242.66c 0.00893 
m7    94239.66c 1.0      $ Pu239 
m8    94238.66c 1.0 
m9    94240.66c 1.0 
m10   94241.66c 1.0 
m11   94242.66c 1.0 
c **** natural hafnium 13.31g/cc **** 
m12   72174.66c 0.00162  
      72176.66c 0.05206 
      72177.66c 0.18606 
      72178.66c 0.27297 
      72179.66c 0.13629 
      72180.66c 0.35100 
c ------- natural boron carbide powder d=1.02g/cc------ 
m13  5010.66c 0.796 
     5011.66c 3.204 
     6000.66c 1.0 
c **** aluminum 2.7g/cc **** 
m14   13027.66c 1.0 
mt14  al27.12t 
c **** 93% U235 **** 
m15   92235.66c 0.93 
      92238.66c 0.07 
c **** steel 8g/cc **** 
m16   24000.50c 1.7385e-2 
      26000.50c 5.9206e-2 
      28000.50c 7.6995e-3 
      25055.66c 1.7320e-3 
c **** Cd-U-Pu ingot 16.63g/cc****** 
m17   92233 -0.00001 
      92234 -0.02625 
      92235 -2.32253 
      92236 -0.17970 
      92238 -1.54901 
      93236.70c -0.00006 
      93237 -0.38558 
      94238 -0.01194 
      94239 -4.86726 
      94240 -1.38619 
      94241 -0.34246 
      94242 -0.09883 
      95241 -0.71767 
      95242 -0.00216 
      95243 -0.05219 
      96242 -0.00381 
      96243 -0.00053 
      96244 -0.01918 
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      96245 -0.00060 
      96246 -0.00001 
      48106 -1.03675  
      48108 -0.75209 
      48110 -10.75008  
      48111 -11.11726 
      48112 -21.14647 
      48113 -10.80493 
      48114 -25.62783 
      48116 -6.79865 
      nlib=66c 
c  
c ------- aluminum can d=6.836g/cc ----- 
m18   13027.70c -97.35975 
      14000.60c -0.4 
      29000.50c -0.15 
      24000.50c -0.04 
      12000.66c -0.8 
      26000.55c -0.7 
      30000.70c -0.25 
      25055.70c -0.15 
      22000.66c -0.15 
      23000.70c -0.00025 
mt18  al27.12t 
c ----- 0.31% U235 U3O8 d=2.6g/cc ---- 
m19   92235.70c -0.00260 
      92238.70c -0.84545 
       8016.70c -0.15196 
c ----- 0.71% U235 U3O8 d=2.6g/cc ---- 
m20   92235.70c -0.00595 
      92238.70c -0.84209 
       8016.70c -0.15196 
c ----- 1.94% U235 U3O8 d=2.6g/cc ---- 
m21   92235.70c -0.01625 
      92238.70c -0.83177 
       8016.70c -0.15198 
c ----- 2.95% U235 U3O8 d=2.6g/cc ---- 
m22   92235.70c -0.02471 
      92238.70c -0.82329 
       8016.70c -0.15200 
c ----- 4.46% U235 U3O8 d=3.47g/cc ---- 
m23   92235.70c -0.03736 
      92238.70c -0.81061 
       8016.70c -0.15202 
c ------- P10 gas d=0.0059268g/cc ----- 
m24    18000.59c 0.9 
       6000.70c 0.02 
       1001.70c 0.08 
c ---rotation ----- 
*tr1= 0 0 0 0 90 90 90 90 0 90 180 90 
c ------ Flux tallies for calculation of fission rate in FC --------- 
F4:n   311 
FM4   (-1 15 -6) 
SD4    1 
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F14:n  321 
FM14  (-1 15 -6) 
SD14   1 
F24:n  331 
FM24   (-1 15 -6) 
SD24    1 
F44:n  341 
FM44  (-1 15 -6) 
nps    1e9 
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APPENDIX C. MCNP MODEL OF THE EBR-II FOR BURNUP CALCULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.1. EBR-II fuel pin MCNP model 
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Figure C.2. MCNP model of EBR-II core 
 
 88 
 
APPENDIX D. EBR-II SPENT FUEL ACTINIDE ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION 
 
 
Actinide Isotope 
wt% in 
spent fuel 
Uranium 
233 0.00018% 
234 0.51553% 
235 45.61617% 
236 3.52938% 
238 30.42372% 
Neptunium 
236 0.00002% 
237 0.15518% 
Plutonium 
238 0.03487% 
239 14.21843% 
240 4.04938% 
241 1.00041% 
242 0.28871% 
Americium 
241 0.15516% 
242 0.00047% 
243 0.01128% 
Curium 
242 0.00017% 
243 0.00002% 
244 0.00086% 
245 0.00003% 
 
